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January 21, 1983 conference
List 3, Sheet 5
No. 82-940
HISHON (female attorney denied
partnership}

Motion of Connecticut WOmen's
Educational and Legal FUnd, Inc.,
et al. for Leave to File a Brief as
Amici curiae

v.
KING AND SPALDING
SUHMARY:
FACTS:

Motion of women's Bar Association of
Illinois for Leave to File a Brief as
Amicus curiae

Amici move for leave to file amicus briefs in supp::>rt of petr.
This case presents the question of whether Title VII applies to

alleged discrimination in a law firm's decision to deny promotion of a female
associate to partnership, and to its decision to discharge her from
employment.
and the

The Connecticut Women's Educational and Legal Fund, Inc., et al.,

v~men's

Bar Association of Illinois filed motions on January 7 and 10,

1983, respectively, for leave to file amicus briefs in supp::>rt of petr.
DISCUSSION:

Although amicus briefs were due January 3, 1983 under Rule

36.1, the briefs should be helpful to the Court.
motions be granted.
1/19/83
PJC
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
January 21, 1983 Conference
List 1, Sheet 4
No. 8 2-940
Cert to CAll (Tjoflat, Fay,
Young [DJ]) (Tjoflat, diSS}

HISHON (woman denied
partnership)

v.
KING & SPALDING (law firm)

1.

SUMMARY:

~discrimination

Timely

Federal/Civil

Petr claims Title VII applies to

inv;romotion-to-partnership decisions and the

discharge of associates denied partnership.
2.

FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW:

50 active partners and 50 associates.

Resp is a law firm with some
Partnership decisions are

made after the sixth year of association with the firm, and those

~

\:..

~ ~

\.A/)

~

~lb.~+ -h ~~- ~~ t1~1'L

-

2 -

denied partnership are discharged under the , firm's up-or-out
policy.
in 1972.

Petr is a female attorney hired by resp as an associate
She was denied partnership in 1979.

Petr filed a three-count complaint alleging sex
discrimination in violation
and a breach of contract.

of~ tle

VII and the Equal Pay Act,

The DC (ND Ga: Edenfield) dismissed

the case under Fed.R.Civ.P 12 (b) (1).

Concerned with resp 's

constitutional right to freedom of association, the DC construed
Title VII as not covering partnership decisions.
~ 1 affirmed.

First, the court rejected the claim that

large partnerships should be treated like corporations, so that
its partners are considered "employees" for purposes of Title
VII.

CAll declined to adopt an "economic reality" test for

~ determining whether partners are employees, the test adopted in

NLRB v. Hearst Publications Co., 322

u.s. 111 (1944), for

determining who are "employees" under the NLRA.

CAll denied its

decision exalted form over substance, and declared that the
partnership form is the substance of the issue.
CAll found support from Burke v. Friedman, 556 F·.2d 867
(CA7), which held that partners were not employees in concluding
that an accounting firm with 4 partners and 13 non-partners was
not within Title VII jurisdiction, which requires 15 employees.
CAll discounted the SC's statement in Bellis v. United States,
417

u.s. 85, 95 (1974) (individual partner's Fifth Amendment

privilege held no bar to production of partnership records), that
?artnerships have "an established institutional identity
independent of its individual partners."

Equally inapplicable,

-

j

-

concluded CAll, is the SC decision in
Cooperative, Inc., 366

u.s.

Goldb~rg

v. Whittaker House

28 (1961), which held that a

cooperative is an "employer" and its members are "employees"
within the meaning of the FLSA.
Second, CAll rejected the argument that resp's promise of
partnership for satisfactory work was a "term, condition or
privilege of employment" protected by §703 (a) (1) and/or an
"employment opportunity" protected by §703 (a) (2).

The court had

"no quarrel" with the premise that an "opportunity" can include
promotion to a position beyond that of an "employee" covered by
Title VII, but declined to extend the meaning beyond its intended
context by encroaching upon individuals' decisions voluntarily to
associate in a business partnership.

The court noted that an

action in breach of contract or misrepresentation may be a more
appropriate vehicle for a legal remedy.
Finally, CAll rejected petr 's "back-door attempt'' to find
Title VII coverage in her argument that her discharge for failure
to make partner was a loss of employment covered by Title VII.
When termination is a result of the partnership decision,
concluded CAll, termination loses its separate identity and must
fall prey to the same ill fate as her original attempt to apply
Title VII to partnership decisions.
Judge Tjoflat dissented.

Regardless of whether the action

is phrased as a rejection of partnership followed by the
incidental discharge from the firm, or phrased as a decision to
fire making petr ineligible for partnership, the decision was,
undeniably, to discharge petr.

Thus, while Title VII would not

-

4 -

apply to the discrete decision whether to take on a new partner
(or a lateral invitation to partnership made to non-associates),
Title VII does apply when the partnership decision inextricably
and inevitably is a decision whether to terminate employment.

3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr, following the arguments rejected by

CAll, suggests that Title VII applies to partnership decisions
under three distinct legal theories.

First, under the entity

theory, a large partnership is a separate legal entity from its
partners and should be considered the employer of the partners.
Second, as a "term, condition or privilege of employment,"
partnership decisions are forbidden under Title VII from being
based on sex.

CAll failed to explain how a promotion decision

could support a breach of contract or misrepresentation claim
without supporting a claim for denial of a privilege of
employment under Title VII.

Third, under the "up or out" policy,

the firm simultaneously decided to terminate her employment and
deny partnership.

The effect of this decision was to "deprive

[petr] of employment opportunities [and] otherwise directly
affect [petr 's] status as an employee" of resp, in violation of
the literal language of §703 (a) (2) of Title VII.
CAll's rejection of these theories goes against the teaching
of County of washington v. Gunther, 452

u.s.

161, 178 (1981),

where the Court instructed that the lower federal courts "must
therefore avoid interpretations of Title VII that deprive victims
of discrimination of a remedy, without a clear congressional
mandate."

There can be no doubt Congress in tended Title VI I to

- 5 -

reach all forms of job discrimination, inc1uding the employment
practices of partnerships.

"Partnership" is expressly included

in the definition of the term "employer" in §70l(a).

Moreover,

when Congress enacted Title VII, it used the same broad
definitions of the terms "employer" and "employee" used in the
NLRA, the SOcial Security Act, and the FLSA;

The Court declared

in NLRB v. Hearst Publications that the applicability of the term
employee "is to be determined broadly, in doubtful situations, by
underlying economic facts rather than technically and exclusively
by previously established legal classifications."
128-29.

322

u.s.,

at

In Golberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, decided only

three years before the passage of Title VII, the Court held that
an "owner" of a cooperative could also be considered an
"employee" if the economic reality of the relationship was that
she worked for the organization.

It is well established that

when Congress uses the same term in a later statute as in earlier
statutes, it is presumed that Congress was aware of SC
interpretations of the earlier statute.

See, e.g., Cannon v.

University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979) •

Finally, petr

notes that CAll's interpretation conflicts with the position of
the EEOC, as enunciated in its amicus brief before CAll.
Resp notes there is no circuit conflict as to whether Title
VII applies to a partnership's determinations regarding its
partners.

Indeed, the only other CA to consider whether partners

are "employees" of a partnership under Title VII, Burke v.
Friedman (CA7), has concluded they are not employees.

Resp

acknowledges that the SDNY went the other way on this precise

- 6 -

issue in Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine

&

Moore, . 425 F .Supp. 12 3 (SDNY

1977) (claim of national origin and religion discrimination in
partnership decision).
Resp also defends the CAll decision on the merits,
characterizing a contrary result that would treat a partnership
as a corporation for Title VII purposes as judicial legislation.
The question of whether Title VII governs admission to
partnership cannot reasonably be isolated from the broader
question of whether Title VII applies to all aspects of the
partners' relations among themselves.

There is no legislative

history that Congress intended such a result.

-z
4.

DISCUSSION:

I

think ~ is'

'- CAll probably decided wrongly.

an important question that

I agree with a basic charge of

petr that the CAll opinion is largely ipse dixit.

Under Judge

Tjoflat's intertwined partner/discharge theory, or the "privilege
of employment" theory, the language of Title VII would appear to
cover this situation.

Although neither side points to any

relevant legislative history beyond the remark of Senator Clark
that "employer" was to have a common, dictionary definition, a
holding that this form of job discrimination is covered by Title
VII

w~

accord with the generally broad intent of Congress.

Note, Applicability of Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation to
the Selection of a Law Partner, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 282 (1977), and
Note, Tenure and Partnership as Title VII Remedies, 94 Harv. L.
Rev. 457 (1980), both conclude that Title VII covers such claims.

-----..

The strongest argument against review is the lack of
conflict among the CAs.

Although several cases have held that

Title VII covers employment discrimination in the hiring of
associates, this is the first CA opinion addressing the
partnership issue.

The SONY in Lucido did go the other way in

holding that Title VII covers promotion-to-partnership
decisions. 1
Although the Court may well have to decide this issue
someday, I recommend waiting for a circuit conflict.
There is a response.

January 13, 1983

Schwab

opns in petn

1one possible procedural problem is that the DC discussed only
the Title VII claim in dismissing the 3-count complaint.
Although the closing sentence in the DC's opinion states that the
court has "no subject-matter jurisdiction of plaintiff's claim
and the case is, therefore, Dismissed," it is possible that the
DC meant to deal only with the Title VII count. If the other
counts remained live, Fed.R.Civ.P 54(b} should have barred an
appeal to the CA. CAll recognized this problem in a footnote,
but noted that petr's brief and a letter to the panel revealed
that the other counts "have been informally withdrawn and
dismissed by plaintiff without prejudice." Resp does not raise
this point as a bar to review, and apparently did not raise it
below.
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March 25, 1983 Conference
supplemental List
Motion of Petitioner to
Unseal Record

No. 82-940
HISHON

v.
KING AND SPALDING

SUH11ARY:

Petr moves that this Court unseal the record in this case.

Both the DC and the CA sealed the record on request of the parties and it was
received by the Clerk's Office in a sealed condition.

Both sides apparently

agree that there is no longer any need for sealing.
FACTS:

The Court granted cert on this case on January 24, 1983.

The

case raises the question of whether Title VII applies to a law firm's decision
to deny partnership to a female associate and its decision to discharge her.
At the request of the parties the DC (ND, Ga., Edenfield) ordered the
record sealed.l

Following dismissal of petr's complaint by the DC, the record

was forwarded to the CA 11 under seal.
~rntion,

Thereafter the CA 11, on resp's

placed all briefs under seal.

Thr record was received by the Clerk's Office in a sealed condition.
Jlow ever, on !'iarch 2, both the resp and the petr moved the CA 11 to unseal the
record so that counsPl and amici might have unfettPred access.

On March 16,

IThe order apparently resulted from a desire to keep certain law firm
records confidential.

-

the CA 11 denied the motion, referring to a letter (dated Feb. 28) from the
clerk of that court to Mr. Stevas.

That letter (app'd) states that theCA

ll's clerk had permitted the parties and their representatives access to the
record for purposes of preparing the joint appendix.
Petr now moves this Court to unseal the record.
CONTENTIONS:

Petr argues that the sealed condition of the record is

hampering efforts by amici to prepare their briefs and has also delayed
preparation of the joint appendix.
DISCUSSION:

In view of the parties' mutual desire to unseal the record

and permit access by other individuals, the motion should be granted.
There is no response.
3/23/83
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
Hishon v. King & Spalding
No. 82-940
David A. Charny

October 25, 1983
Question Presented

Whether title VII applies to a law firm's decision not to
invite an associate to join the partnership.

page

Outline
I. Background

3

II. Analysis
A. Partners as Ernployess

5

B. Liability Premised upon Petr's Status as an Associate

12

c.

15

Rights of Association

III. Conclusion

21

I. Background
Petr is an attorney employed by resp law firm.

Petr

worked for resp from the time of her graduation from law school
until . l979, when resp decided not to invite petr to join the
partnership.

Shortly thereafter, under the firm's established

policy, petr's association with the firm was ended.
Petr filed a grievance with the EEOC, alleging that the
decision no r to invite her to join the partnership was made on
account of petr's sex.

The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter,

and petr filed suit in the district court.
Before the courts below, as before this Court, petr
pressed three theories of title VII liability.

First, because

the partners were employed by the partnership as an entity, title
VII applied to the partnership's decision not to "hire" her as a
partner.

~

by discriminatorily depriving petr of her op-

portunity to join the partnership, the partners discriminated
against petr in a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment
and discriminatorily "classif[ied]" petr in a "way which would
adversely affect [her] status as an employee."
2000e-2 (c) (1), (2).

42

u.s.c.

§

Third, the partners discriminated against

petr by terminating her employment as an associate¢ on the basis
o~

the discriminatory decision not to invite her to join the

partnership.
After preliminary discovery, the DC dismissed for want
of jurisdiction.

The DC first concluded that King and Spalding

was undoubtedly a partnership under state law and a

r---

the sense of a voluntary association.

pa~ership
1\

The DC therefore decided

in

that petr did not deserve a further

opp~rtunity

to prove that the

partnership really functioned as an entity which employed lawyers
under the label "partners" and denied petr's request to discovery
such matters as the capital contribution required of resp's partners, the amount of the firm surplus and the interest of the
partners in it, the division of income among the partners.
Reaching the question whether title VII applied to law

'-'

'
'
'
partners h 1ps,
t h e DC h el d t h at t h e I(freedom of assoc1at1on
was
implicated by government regulation of decisions as to the memberships in professional partnership.

The court found the lan-

guage of title VII "confused" on the question whether the terms
of the act extended to partnerships.

___....,

t_'A1
,......,

The one circuit to have

considered the issue had held that partnerships were not covered,
Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977); the court distinguished Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), as dealing with discharge of an associate, not
an invitation to join a partnership.

The DC concluded that, be-

cause the coverage of the Act was unclear, while the right to
freedom of association as well established, the Act should be
construed not to apply to law partnerships.
The CA 5 affirmed.

It rejected petr's argument that the

partners at King & Spalding were in actuality employees of a corporation, noting that King & Spalding met the criteria for partnership established by Georgia law.

The court concluded that

"partners" were not "employees" under title VII, because partners
are joint co-owners who have voluntarily pooled their assets for
a common business venture.

The court further rejected petr's

contention that the opportunity to join , the partnership was a
"term, condition, or privilege of employment" or an "employment

oppo,~tuni ty" covered by section 703.

/f

Partnerhsip is . not employ-;~

ment within the meaning of the Act, and Lso cannot be an emptoyment opportunity.

With regard to the definition of term or con-

dition of employment, the court simply asserted that "decisions
as to who will be partners are not within the protection of Title
VII."

Finally, the court held that the termination of petr's

employment following the decision not to make her a partner was
simply a consequence of the partnership decison and therefore not
covered by the Act.
Judge Tjoflat, dissenting, would have accepted petr's
third argument.

In the present case, "the partnership decision

inextricably and inevitably is a-ctecision
whether to terminate
·-..........__

\

employment."
II. Analysis
A. Partners as employees

Title VII itself makes no attempt to define "employ,"
"employer," or "employee." 1

The legislative history offers two

guides to the interpretation of "employment" and related terms.
First, the terms are to be given their "common dictionary meaning."

110 Cong. Rec. 7216 (1964).

Second, the House Report

notes that the terms "are defined ••. in the manner common for

1 Although section 703(a) (1) refers to an employer's decision to
"refuse to hire •.• any individual," petr does not contend that
the use of the term "individual" rather than "employee" extends
the Act to cover individuals other than employees.

~

Federal statutes." H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
I

(1963), at 27.
The common meaning of employment suggests that partnerships are not covered by the statute.

Under the common law, the

partners are co-owners of an enterprise carried on by them as a
joint venture.
ship, § 3.

See generally Crane and Bromberg, Law of Partner-

It makes little sense to consider partners employees

of a venture they own and manage.

Of course, for some purposes,

the partnership is considered an independent entity separate fro~
the partners.

Rarely, however, does this conception to treating

the partners as employees of the partnership.

The Uniform Part-

nership Act contains no such provision; and only a

;andfulA~:tes

consider a partner an employee under workmen's compensation statutes, usually where special provision for such coverage is made
by statute.

See Note, Applicability of Federal Antidiscrimina-

tion Legislation to the Selection of a Law Partner, 76 Mich. L.
Rev. 282, 286 n. 33 (1977).
The application of the term "employee" in other federal
statutes supports this interpretation.
ployee under the

~ ir

A partner is not an em-

Labor Standards Act, 29

u.s.c.

§§

201-219.

See Alpenstein v. Irwin B. Foster & Sons Sportswear Co., 193 F.
Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1961).

~ocial

Partners are not employees under the

Security Act, and indeed were not covered by the Act even

-----------------

7

before it was amended (as discussed below) to incorporate explicitly the common law definition of employment.

See U.S. v. Whole-

sale Oil Co., 154 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1946) . 2

Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages.

Petr does not contend that all partners at common law
I

should be be considered "employees" under title VII.

Rather,

petr proposes that an inquiry into the "economic realities" of
the King & Spalding firm will show that it is not a partnership
in the common law sense, but rather an entity (otherwise undefined)

that employs employees whom it labels "partners."
Again, this argument finds little support either in the

common usage of the term "employ" or in the use of the term in
other federal statutes.

Petr does not cite a single case, under

any federal or state labor statutes, where those who conducted
their business in the partnership form have been considered em-

'-

ployees.

~-

Indeed, the state courts have intended to accept the

partnership label even where it was apparently adopted in order
to avoid application of a state statute governing "employee" relations.

See Kershnar v. Heller, 14 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct.

1939): Angelos v. Mesevich, 289 N.Y. 498, 46 N.E.2d 903, rev'd on
other grounds, 320

u.s.

293 (1943).

2 Bellis v. United States, 417 u.s. 85 (1974), the one case
decided by this Court that might support the "entity" theory of
partnership, makes sense only in the unique context of the fifth
amendment. The essential premise of that decision is that the
fifth amendment privilege "should be 'limited to its historic
function of protecting only the natural individual from
compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal
records.'" rd., at 89-90. Partnership records, as records
possessed jointly by the partners, see id., at 98, are thus not
"purely personal" in the sense required--sy the fifth amendment,
which may not be invoked by an "articifical organization." Id.
And in Bellis, the petr held the records solely as representative
of the partnership, not because of any personal claim to them.
In any event, even if a partnership is treated as an "entity" for
some purposes, this does not imply that the partners are
"employees" of that entity.

Further, the fact that resp has modified common law
I

rules governing some aspects of the partnership's business should
make no difference to determination of the partners' status.
The partnership agreement itself is adopted as an exercise of the
partners' rights as owners of their jointly owned assets or managers of the partnership business.
§

18.

See Uniform Partnership Act,

The Bellis case, upon which petr heavily relies, recog-

nizes that whether the partnership is treated as an entity does
not depend upon whether the partners have modified the rules for
partnership governance supplied by the common law or by statute.
See 417

u.s.,

at 96.

Finally, petr contends that cases under the federal
labor statutes, including those under title VII, have tended to
\..J

. / extend the scope of the term

~~

~

"employee" by ignoring the distinc-

tions recognized at common law between employees and other entrepreneurs such as partners and independent contractors.
cites NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322

u.s.

111 (1944)

Petr
(National

Labor Relations Act); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947)
(Social Security Act); and Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366

u.s.

28 (1961)

(Fair Labor Standards Act).

-

It is true that these cases urge examination of "economic realities" to determine whether an individual is an employ-

~
~

Howeve::-both Hearst Publications and Silk were explicitly

overruled by Congress, which indicated soon after the decisions
issued that they intended "employee" under the relevant statutes
to be determined by reference to th
United Insurance Co., 390

u.s.

254,

See NLRB v.

cussing

Hearst)~

188 (1970).

United States v. Webb, Inc., 397 U.S. 179, 183-

Congress expressed its discontent with an approach

that abandoned "established standards of law" for "dimensionless
and amorphous abstraction."

See Webb, 397 U.S., at 188.

This

concern is equally applicable to title VII.
Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., is not
precedent for a

different ~

The Fair Labor Standards Act,

unlike title VII and the other acts discussed above, does contain
an explicit definition of "employ" -- to "suffer or permit to
work" -- intended to be broader in scope than the common law of
employment.

See 366

u.s.,

at 32.

Further, the Court described

the cooperative association at issue in the case as a "device •••
too transparent to survive the statutory definition of 'employ'"
and emphasized that the workers in question had a duties and
privileges in relation to the cooperative identical to that they
would have as employees of an individual proprietor.

Whitaker at

best supports the undeniable proposition that an entity could not
evade the application of title VII merely by calling its employees "partners" without adopting the substance of a partnership
relationship.
Against this background, it is not surprising that most

-

courts have adopted ~ommon law distinctions to define "employee"
under title VII, except where the language or legislative history
expressly indicates that a certain economic relationship is "employment."
Mich 1980)

Armbruster v. Quinn, 498 F. Supp. 858, 86-861 (D.C.
~

Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513, 516-

517 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd 580 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1976)

~

Burke v.

Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 870 (7th Cir.

1~77).

See also Spirides

v. reinhardt, 486 F. Supp. 685, 687 (D.D.C. 1980)

(examining com-

mon law status and status under federal tax and social security
statutes) •
More generally, Congress arguably intended in this case
a more expansive definition of "employment" because the purposes
of anti-discrimination laws are to provide equally to all individuals the opportunity to work, regardless of the discriminatory
preferences of others.

uals~

Society as well as the affected individ-

individual's opportunities to work are determined

1\

according to his abilities, not extraneous factors such as race.
See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

u.s.

792, 801

u.

Chic. L.

(1973); Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38
Rev. 235, 249-253 (1971).

Accordingly, it would be argued, title

VII should apply whenever the opportunity to work is in question,
regardless of the legal definition of the work relationship, be
it that of employment, partnership, membership in a cooperative,
or proprietorship.
This argument ignors the point that there are costs to

--------------------------

enforcing an anti-discrimination law which Congress and the
courts have considered in defining the law's scope. __For example,

-

too rigorous enforcement of title VII may have a chilling effect
on the exercise of sound judgment in choosing one's employees or

/

~

colleagues, particularly where these judgments are based on intu-

~

itions that are difficu t to defend in court, or on confidential

~~ facts.
~~

See, e.g.

None According to

o Each According to His Ability, From
The Concept of Merit in the Law of

Antidiscrimination, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 815, 855 (1980).

That it

I

seems desirable to root out discrimination does not mean that an
anti-dscrimination law should be given the maximum conceivable
application.
issues:

The debate in Congress on title VII focused on two

the economic plight of the blacks, on the one hand, and

the impact of the law of freedom of association and the free conduct of business enterprises, on the other.

In ~~g4title

VII to apply to employment relationships, Congress made a determination that the benefits of applying an anti-discrimination law
to employment -- but not to other economic relationships -- outweigh the costs of such regulation.

If the language of the stat-

ute gives no indication that Congress made a similar determination for partnerships or other economic relationships, this Court
is not free to strike a different balance by giving an expansive
definition to "employment" that the common meaning of the word
will not bear and that the legislative history will not support.
I would conclude that the courts consider "partners" to
employees under title VII only where partnership form has been
adopted to evade federal regulation and where the "partners" enrights and privileges of partnership.

No elabo-

rate inquiry is necessary in a case such as the present one,
where it is apparent from the history and structure of the enterprise that it ----~~
is i tbona fide partnershi~~~------------------------The information that
petr sought to discover concerning the detailed operation of the
partnership is superfluous. A multitude of arrangements governing
profit-sharing and management are consistent with partnership at
common law.

It is characteristic of partnership that the part-

ners are largely free to agree to conduct their business as they
I

will.
A troublesome case for this approach is the one of a

--

vast partnership, where the partners take no real part in the
conduct of the business, receive a fixed salary as compensation
and in general do not display the traditional aspect of a partner
at common law.

The large accounting firms provide an example.

It might be argued that partners should be treated as employees
when the partnership is so large that no small group of partners
can conceivably exert a direct influence on the management of the
business or the selection of other partners.

The courts are free

to develop such a rule, as they are free to disregard merely
"sham" partnerships.

But this issue does not arise here,

be-

cause it can probably be concluded even on the basis of the
record that King & Spalding is not such a partnership.
B. Liability Premised on ~etr's Status as an Associate

1

Petr~
kes

( t:Ht..

ciate.

l'

two arguments based on her status as an asso-

~·..i
~>
First~ partnership decision discriminated against

petr with regard to a "term, condition, or privilege" of her employment as an associate and "classified" her as an associate on
the basis of sex.

Second, because petr's employment terminates

when she is declined for partnership, a partnership decision
based on sex results in discharge based on sex.
Each of these arguments has some merit.

The SG's brief

I I

quite persuasively explains that the opportunity to be invited to
join

,.

may constitute a central incentive for law-

yers to become associated with a firm and may provide the central

criterion for evaluation of the

associa~e.

Further, title VII

undeniably applies to benefits conferred at the end of a term of
employment such as pensions, e.g., Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich
Co., 541 F.2d 1040, 1042 (4th Cir. 1976), while, by analogy to
cases decided under the National Labor Relations Act, title VII
would be applicable to "promotion" from employment statuj s to
positions not themselves covered by title VII. Cf. Golden State
Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 188 (1973).
Nonetheless, "promotion" to partnership may not be analogous to these cases.

The opportunity to become a partner is not

-----

made available primarily as a kind of "bonus" designed to prod
associates on to greater efforts; nor is it, unlike a pension,
---------~--------------

simply a form of delayed compensation.

More generally, a part-

nership opportunity may not be a term or condition of employment
in that the purpose or design of the status of partnership is
not, directly or indirectly, to provide compensation for associates or an incentive for better work by them.

Rather, the law

firm traditionally employed associates to identify and train lawyers qualified eventually to assume the status of partnership. 3
(In contrast, it could not be argued that the primary purpose of
employing factory workers is to be able to pay them bonuses upon
retirement or to promote them to foreman positions.)

In this

3This will not always be the case. At more and more large
firms, associates join the firm with no serious of intention of
attempting to join the partnership. But petr's arguments would
then have no application at all: for such associates, the
opportunity to join the partnership can hardly be a term,
condition, or privilege of employment.

F

sense, p~ r's ~~ s su~je ~ar~ nership decisions to
title VII "through the back door."
~=------=--~~

~

For once it is conceded that

title VII does not apply directly to the decision to invite an
individual to join the partnership, it seems slightly anomalous
to apply title VII simply because conferring associate status is
part of the process by which the law firm makes the partnership
Title VII would not ~£;z Y if the firm simp ~ invited a
(-'.~·
~~p4+M.c ...... ~
lawyer to join the partnership; but it would apply if the f1rm ~-

decision.

invited a lawyer to join the firm as an associate with the expectation that he would later become a partner. 4
Although this is a close question, it appears that petr
has the better of this argument simply as a matter of statutory
construction.

Associates are clearly employees.
L~-----~

Congress's

~--------------

broad language -- "terms, conditions, or privileges" -- would
mean in the present case that if a law firm had a system of selecting new partners which included first employing them as associates, then the law firm could not discriminate in partnership
selection.

I would concede that the statute could bear the oppo-

site construction, however: a term or condition of employment, or
a classification adversely affecting employment, would be one
attached to the status of employee either to serve as an incentive or a compensation for work done while an employee or in some
4 Petr's third argument also confuses the purposes of associate
status with one of the peripheral effects of this purpose. Petr
loses employment after the partnership decision is made because
the purpose of the employment -- to determine the qualifications
of the associate for partnership -- has been accomplished.

....,..J~

way to regulate the conduct of employees.
,

Because the partner-

ship decision primarily serves a very different purpose, it would
not fall within these statutory terms.

Either approach is con-

sistent with the statutory language and legislative history.
And, as I shall discuss, rights of association might provide a
ter approach.

courts below propose that title VII should
be interpreted not to apply to partnership decisions to avoid
constitutional questions as to infringement upon rights of asso-

,,

ciation.

~

The right of association was first declared to protect
the right of association to promote association to further one's
ideas and beliefs.
449 {1958).

u.s.

NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357

u.s.

In a line of cases culminating invin re Primus, 436

412 {1978), the Court has indicated that "collective activi-

ty undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the first amendment."
!d., at 422 {quoting United Transportation Union v. Michigan Bar,
401

u.s.

576, 585 {1971)).

Assn., 389

u.s.

Bar, 377 U.S. 1,
{1963).
{1977)

See Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar

217, 222 {1967); Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia
~ 1964);

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438

See also Bates v. Arizona Bar, 433

u.s.

350, 376 n. 32

{"Underlying [these cases] was the Court's concern that

the aggrieved receive information regarding their legal rights
and the means of effectuating them.")

--------

right of lawyers to act on their

These cases protect the

clients and advising them as to how to vindicate their rights;
I

•

and they protect the right of non-legal organizations to advise
and assist their members in consulting lawyers.

But if the first

amendment encompasses these activities, it must extend some pro-

----------------------------~--------

~ ection as well to the collective association of lawyers ~

•
1

~~ef :ectiv~id _th:! r client~

~ e/"

the assertion of legal _

:=aims.
Another line of right of association cases might also
support resp's position.

In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381

u.s.

7

479 (1965), the Court recognized that the first amendment created
a more general right of association, including such matters as
freedom of association in intimate relations and in decisions
about schooling.

"'Freedom to associate and privacy in one's

associations" establishes a "privacy

protected from govern-

mental intrusion," protecting "forms of 'association' that are
not political in the customary sense but pertain to the social,
legal and economic benefit of the members . . • • "

A law partner-

ship may, for reasons considered below, constitute such an association.

~~~
Title VII might arguably infringe upon these rights in

two ways.

----

First, there may be in some circumstances an absolute

right to choose law partners free from government interference,
even where one's preferences are partially influenced by racial
attitudes.

True, the Court in the past has suggested that the

right of association does not confer any privilege to engage in
discriminatory conduct free of government interference.

But the

Court has faced the question only in the context of laws outlaw-

ing racial discrimination by entities which purported served the
I

public generally.

u.s.

For example, Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326

88, 94 (1945), upheld a ban on discrimination by labor

unions-- "an organization ••• which holds itself out to represent the general business needs of employees."

In upholding

Title II's prohibition of discrimination in public accommodations, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379

u.s.

241-L 260 (1964), found that the persons to whom the Act applied
had been obligated under the common law "to furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply

../

for them."_ Runyon v. McCrary, 427

u.s.

160 (1975), held that the

right of association did not protect the right to attend a racially discriminatory private school where that school invited
attendance from the public generally.
In contrast, "in certain personal contractual relationships ••• such as those where the offeror selects those with whom
he desires to bargain on an individualized basis, or where the
contract is the foundation of a close association

. ..,

there is

reason to assume that, although the choice made by the offeror is
selective, it reflects 'a purpose of exclusiveness' other than
the desire to bar members of the Negro race.

Such a purpose,

certainly in most cases, would invoke associational rights long
respected."

Id., at 187-188 (JUSTICE POWELL, concurring).

In

such cases, the right of association would seem to forbid any
government attempt to regulate the preferences which underly personal choice.

Griswold, and the cases protecting freedom of as-

sociation under the first amendment, imply that some associa-

tions, such as those involved in family life or education, are so
I

fundamental to the individual that the government may not tamper
with these associations in ways to which the individual would
hold objection.
It may be argued from these cases that a partnership,

-

--

particularly a law partnership, may be a "close association" to
which constitutional protection would attach.

An enterprise in

partnership, at least when the number of partners is small, will
bring the partners into close collaboration with each other.

And

in the case of law partnership, the association is a collective
enterprise to vindicate legal rights, which is protected by the
first amendment.
However, the associations that the Court has so far considered have been either been the family, or some association
directly or indirectly involved with the advocacy of particular
views.

NAACP v. Button and its progeny might be viewed as cases

securing a collective right to disseminate information or ideas
concerning means of obtaining legal representation.

An associa-

tion to practice law would then deserve special protection only
insofar as it advocated some distinctive viewpoint.

In contrast,

the government exercises broad power to regulate commercial, ineluding professional, conduct by associations. E.g. North Dakota
State Bd. v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414

u.s.

156 (1973)

(sustaining requirement that corporation operating pharmacy be
owned and operated by registered pharmacists).

The commercial

practice of law is not a special first amendment enclave free of
government regulation.

Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436

u.s.

447, 459 (1978)

("A lawyer's procurement of remunerative
I

employment is a subject only marginally affected with First
Amendment concerns.")

Although the choice of partners may merit

some first amendment protection, Congress' policy of assuring
employment based on merit would then advance interests of sufficient importance to constitute a reasonable exercise of regulatory power.
While I believe that title VII as applied to any law
partnership would probably be constitutional, I am inclined to
think that this may raise a constitutional question of sufficient
difficulty that the Court should avoid it by applying the "clear
statement doctrine."

Although the Court's precedents do not sup-

ply any strong precedent for a holding of unconstitutionality,
they do suggest principles that suggest caution in extending
title VII this far absent a more express indication of congressional intent.

Cf. Kent v. Dulles, 357

u.s.

116, 129 (1958)

(narrow construction of statute to avoid constitutional
question); Chiarella v. United States, 445

u.s.

222, 233 (1980)

(requiring "explicit evidence of legislative intent" to expand
upon duties of securities traders).

The practice of law among a

group of partners, particularly a small group, brings the partners into close association.

And because the practice of law

places upon the lawyer a responsibility for civic affairs, a law
firm often will be in a broad sense a political association even
when it does not undertake to represent merely a single political
viewpoint or message (as some firms in fact tend to do).

Even if there is no general ri9ht to make partnership
choices free from extensive government scrutiny, application of
title VII may be of questionable constitutionality because it has
a chilling effect on free choice. NAACP v. Alabama recognized
---------------~-----------that coerced disclosure of information about an association might
violate associational rights by impeding the association's ability to recruit members.

Disclosure is equally coerced if a firm

may defend a title VII suit only by revealing confidences concerning the governance of the firm and the affairs of individual
clients.

The record shows that petr in this case sought to dis-

cover information about how petr handled the cases on which she
worked.
The courts may protect this right adequately through the
evidentiary rules and burdens of proof applied in title VII
suits.

For example, in the "discriminatory treatment" suit, the

defendant has the burden of articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to hire the plaintiff:

it should be

recognized that an articulated reason sufficiently general to
avoid breaching confidences or revealing the internal affairs of
the firm should satisfy this burden.

Protective orders are

available to prevent intrusive discovery.

In the "discriminatory

impact" suit, the law firm should be able to meet its burden of
showing the "business necessity" of statistically discriminatory
practices, sufficient "business necessity" for discretionary and
subjective hiring standards should lie in the need for selecting
new partners in accordance with the prudent judgment of the part-

nership.

The rights of association may , require substantial def-

erence by the courts to the partnership's judgments.
III. Conclusion
It seems fairly clear that title VII by its terms does
not apply generally to decisions to invite an individual to join
a partnership.

It is a close question, however, whether title

VII applies to some partnership decisions because it can be shown
that the opportunity to be considered for partnership was a
"term, condition, or privilege" of employment.

The statutory

language might be construed not to apply to the opportunity to
become a partner where the main purpose of the employment is to
enable the firm to consider the associate's qualifications for
partnership and to train the associate to assume the responsibilities of partnership.

The Court might prefer this narrower con-

struction of the statute to avoid the difficult constitutional
question whether rights of association protect from government
scrutiny a lawyer's decision to practice law in partnership with
another lawyer.
I consider the case close for two reasons.

First, the

statutory language -- "term, condition, or privilege" -- is quite
sweeping, and the narrower construction that I have proposed
finds no specific support in the structure of the statute or the
legislative history and so might appear strained.

Second, the

Court's precedents establishing the right of association addressed situations quite different from that in question here.
The constitutional question is difficult not because there are
conflicting precedents but because there are no cases at all that

provide satisfactory guidance to the

Co~rt

in balancing rights of

association against the goals of equal employment opportunity
enacted in title VII.
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MEMO TO FILE:
Points that may be relevant include:
1. ,j Subjective

judgments necessarily are made.

Examples:
a.

Tenure decisions by a faculty.

b.

Selecting law clerks.

c. ~ Selecting from a group of summer clerks ones
invited to become associates of the firm.
d. ~ Where
experienced

tax

a

partner

firm,

for

example,

and

several

good

needs
tax

an

lawyers

apply.
,e. / would Title VII apply to divisions of firm
profits?

( ~~t''~~?)
f.

Under

the

K&S

partnership

agreement,

a

partner is required to leave upon a vote by two thirds in
interest of the partners, and "no cause need exist or be
shown" (A, p. 154).

Is this invalid?
...
What if petitioner were admitted to partnership,

and later were asked to leave?

2.
include

The qualities that bring success to a lawyer

a

broad

judgments.

spectrum.

Most

subjective

At the initial employment stage, there is the

college and law school record.
the

involve

sole

If

criteria.

Rarely is this considered

so,

interviews

would

be

unnecessary.
Law
positions

firms

therefore

quality

of

personality
prospects

to

offer

associate

to students who have been summer clerks.

observation during
the

tend

that brief period

legal

and
for

work.

become

an

involves more

Judgments

congeniality,

The

client

influential

are

made

than

as

to

acceptability,
citizen

in

the

community.

3.
professions.
/accounting

The

legal

Law

profession

-

is

not

or ~engineering.

an

differs

exact

The most

from

other

discipline
successful

like

lawyers

have a variety of skills in addition to sheer intellectual
ability.
The range of what a lawyer may be called on to
do

is

as

broad

as

the

system of our country.
identifiable boundaries.

democratic

and

free

enterprise

The need for legal services has no
A lawyer should have a capacity

to speak and write well, ability to inspire confidence, to
influence the thinking and judgments of other people, and
to adapt quickly to an

infinite number of unpredictable

situations.
Judgments as to which among several associates
possess

best

subjective.
with

Indeed,

whom

selection
review

these

the
is

by

a

a

qualities

necessarily

are

largely

they

vary

the

partners

will

among

associate

has

worked.

In

decision

that

should

not

court

or

jury

or

least

the

end,

the

be

subject

of

all

to

by

a

prosecutorial agency like the EEOC.

4.
lawyers
firms

~

Firms

who

-

have

seek

out

do

not

served
new

admit

as

to

partnership

associates.

partners

from

only

Increasingly,

other

firms,

from

~-------------------------------------

government

positions,

department.

There

to

is

fill

no

a

need

formalized

in

a

particular

apprentice

system

under which one must first serve as an associate.
5.

Discrimination

is

unlikely

to

occur

certainly at this late date - because it is contrary to a
firm's
can be

best interest.
analogi zed

making 'draft

A law firm's partnership decision

rough

selections:

to

that of

a

repeatedly,

pro football

team

head

wi 11

coaches

say that ideally they will draft to fill a particular need
(e.g.,

a corner back) or if a quality corner back is not

available,
Making
lawyers
also

coaches

draft

the

"best

athlete"

available.

judgments between athletes is easier than between
because of

there

are

measurable

intangibles

acuity and a will to win.
that of a

football

team,

-

physical
spirit,

attributes.

leadership,

But

mental

The future of a law firm, like
depends on the wisdom and care

with which partners are chosen.

Neither sex nor race is a

negative factor in a modern law firm.

6.

Title VII was enacted not merely to prevent

indefensible discrimination.
and

It furthered national policy

the American goal of providing equal opportunity in

initial employment and promotions.

Public policy extends

in the most limited sense, if at all, to the employment of
lawyers

as

associates

public

policy

in

firms.

implicated

decisions with in a law firm.

with

There

certainly

respect

Indeed,

to

is

no

promotion

they are subject -

certainly in most firms - to approval of the partners who
judge all of the factors mentioned above.

argument

7.

There

that

since

partnership
with

respect

employment.

cannot
to

is
an

plausibility
associate

is

discrimination

a

"term,

to

an

petitioner's

"employee",

against

condition,

or

an

the

associate

privilege"

of

The argument goes on to say that one of the

"terms" of the employment is a right to nondiscriminatory
treatment when the partnership decision is made.

This is

tantamount to a promotion.
This argument subjects partnership decisions to
Title VII "through the backdoor".
partnership

itself

is

not

"an

If one agrees, that the
entity"

analogous

corporation subject

to Title VII,

nevertheless

that by conferring associate

to say

to

a

it makes little sense

the firm thereupon becomes subject to the statute.

status
Even

then, unless one treats a parternership as a corporation a
law firm could

invite an

individual to become a partner

who had never had any prior association with the firm - as
often
within

happens.
the

firm

And

what

about

{incidentially

subsequent
they

are

promotions
not

called

"promotions" and are evidenced by increases in a partner's
participation in profits.

And what about decreases where

a partner ceases to be as productive as formerly?

~
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Note to David:
In thinking about the subjective factors that as I know from my law partnership years look at what I wrote in Bakke, 438

u.s.

I have taken a

267, at 317, 318.

It may have some relevance.
My view in Bakke, that became the law so far as
university admissions are concerned, was that a college or
university could consider race among a number of qualities
in making admission decisions:
"Such
qualities
could
include
exceptional
personal
talents,
unique
work
·or
service
experience,
leadership
potential,
maturity,
demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming
disadvantage, ability to communicate with the
poor, or other qualifications deemed important."
Id., at 317
On

the

next

page,

p.

318,

I

refer

to

these

qualification and spoke of "similar nonobjective factors".
Of

course,

Bakke

was

a

Title

VI

and

Equal

Protection Clause case rather than Title VII though this
in itself may not make a difference.

Moreover, Bakke was

written

freedom

in

light

of

the

academic

tradition and the First Amendment support.

that

both

In this case,

2

0

there is the somewhat related "right to associate" under
the

First Amendment

that

formations should have.
for its own sake.

at

least

arguably partnership

Law firms do not seek "diversity"

They certainly do consider specifically

subjective qualities that are so essential to lawyers in
general, and that may be particularly important depending
on which department in a law firm there is need for an
additional

partner.

An

personality may be needed for

entirely

different

type

the labor department from

that deemed desirable in the tax department.

Similarly,

most litigation partners had rather be "caught dead" than
working

in a real estate department -

versa.
David, what do you think?

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

and perhaps vice
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

J )1

~

No.82-940

C

ELIZABETH ANDERSON HISHON , PETITIONER v.
KING & SPALDING
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[January-, 1984]

<:J,

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Co:. granted certiorari to detennine whether the District
Court properly dismissed a Title VII complaint alleging that
a law partnership employed petitioner as an associate with
the express representation that she would receive nondiscriminatory consideration for partnership and that this promise was breached when the partnership discriminated against
her in refusing to make her a partner.
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In 1972 petitioner Elizabeth Anderson Hishon accepted a
position as an associate with respondent, a large Atlanta law
firm established as a general partnership. When this suit
was filed in 1980, the firm had more than 50 partners and employed approximately 50 additional attorneys as associates.
Up to that time , no woman had ever been a partner at the
firm.
hl-~~rbn< · ~In May 1978 the partnership consipered and rejected
~~A:;
Hishon for admission to the partnershiW one year later, the
~~
partners again declined to invite Hishon to become a part-~ ,

"
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ner. 1 Once an associate is not selected for partnership, the
associate is notified to begin seeking employment elsewhere.
Petitioner's employment as an associate was terminated effective December 31, 1979.
Hishon filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on November 19, 1979, claiming that respondent had discriminated against her on the basis of her
sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S. C. §§2000e et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V). Ten days later
the Commission issued a notice of right to sue, and on February 27, 1980, Hishon brought this action in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. She
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, back pay, and compensatory damages "in lieu of reinstatement and promotion
to partnership." Joint Appendix (J. A.) 15.
Petitioner's complaint alleges that, before she accepted
employment as an associate, respondent represented to her
that it hired new associates "with the expectation that the associate lawyer will be promoted and become a partner in the
. . . firm on a fair and equal basis and within a reasonable period of time." Id., at 8--9. Respondent allegedly represented further that "[a]ssociates who receive satisfactory
evaluations from the firm will be promoted and made partners in the firm as a matter of course after [a] five or six year
period of apprenticeship," and that she accepted employment
in "reliance upon the[se] representations and assurances."
Id., at 9.
B

The District Court viewed respondent's partnership as a
consensual relationship protected by the constitutional free1
The parties dispute whether the partnership actually reconsidered the
1978 decision at the 1979 meeting. King & Spalding claims it voted not to
reconsider the question and that Hishon therefore was required to file her
claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180
days of the May 1978 meeting, not the meeting one year later, see 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e). The District Court's disposition of the case made it
unnecessary to decide that question, and we do not reach it either.
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dom of association and dismissed the complaint on the ground
that Title VII was inapplicable to the selection of partners by
a partnership. 2 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303
(N. D. Ga. 1980). A divided panel of the United States
Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that Title VII did not
apply to the selection of partners. 678 F. 2d 1022 (CAll
1982). We granted certiorari to review the dismissal of the
complaint,-- U.S.--, and we reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
II
Our resolution of this case turns on the all g ions of the
complaint, which at this stage we must a cept as true. A
court may dismiss a complaint on y 1 1s e am at no relief could be granted usd:et-:-any--set:-of--faets that could be
proved in support of the allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355
U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Here we have an explicit allegation
that the respondent made a contract to consider petitioner
for partnership on a "fair and equal" basis. If she can prove
at trial that such a contract was made, and that the agreement was violated for the reasons she alleges, petitioner will
be entitled to relief under Title VII.
A

The relevant portion of Title VII provides as follows:
"(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employerThe District Court dismissed under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1) on
the ground that it lacked suO}ect-matter jurisdiction over petitioner's
claim. Before it did so, limited discovery took place concerning the manner in which respondent was organiZed. The court illd not find any ''jurisdictwnaf facTs" in dispute , however. See Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U. S.
442, 446 (1942). Its reasoning makes clear that it dismissed petitioner's \
complaint on the assumption that all of her allegations could be proved.
Because we find that the complaint did in fact state a claim cognizable
under Title VII, we do not consider the wisdom of the District Court's invocation of Rule 12(b)(1), as opposed to Rule 12(b)(6).
2
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(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a).
It is useful at this point to distinguish between two theories
petitioner offers to bring her complaint within the scope of
this language. Her first theory rests on the assertion that
respondent partners are m reality "employees" of the partnership. She recognizes that this assertion conflicts with the
common-law understanding of a partner's role in a partnership but urges nonetheless that, in line with this Court's interpretation of other federal statutes, the employment relationship for Title VII purposes should be defined by
contemporary "economic realities," not common-law standards. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111
(1944); accord Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc.,
366 U. S. 28 (1961); United States v. Silk , 331 U. S. 704
(1947). Petitioner alleges that the arrangements in respondent's formal partnership agreement 3 are sufficiently differ3
Some of the ways in which King & Spalding's partnership agreement
deviates from the rules that would apply in the absence of such an agreement are as follows. (1) The partnership is not dissolved by the addition,
withdrawal, or death of a partner, but only by a two-thirds vote of "participating units." J. A. 154-55 (~ 5). Contra Ga. Code § 14-8-90 (1982);
Harwell v. Cowan, 175 Ga. 33, 165 S. E. 19 (1932). (2) The firm is gov- 1
erned not by majority vote of the partners but by the decisions of a threepartner management committee, which are subject to override by a twothirds vote of the partners. J. A. 162-63 ( ~ 14). Contra Ga. Code
§ 14-8-42. (3) Unless the partnership actually dissolves, a partner separating from the firm is entitled only to a refund of his cash capital contribu-
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ent from those established at common law that respondent is
different in name only from a corporation and that its partners are in reality the same as corporate employees. If she
is correct that partners in this context are "employees" for
Title VII purposes, a refusal to extend a partnership invitation may be viewed as a refusal to "hire" subject to Title
VII's nondiscrimination commands.
See 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1).
Because we find that petitioner's second theory of liability
supports her allegations, as explained below, we need not
fully resolve whether respondent's partners may be viewed
as employees for Title VII purposes. We do, however,
question the extent to which respondent's organization differs from a traditional partnership. A partnership is a consensual or contractual relationship in which two or more individuals associate themselves by choice in a common endeavor
for their common benefit. The essential features of this relationship, which petitioner implicitly concedes distinguish a
typical partner from a mere employee, are all apparently
present in respondent's organization. Respondent's partners bear ultimate responsibility for managing firm affairs; 4
they may each contractually bind the firm in business matters, Ga. Code § 1~1; they are individually liable for the
partnership's debts, id., §§ 14--&-22, -46, and they share in
the benefits of the partnership's profits and the burden of its
expenses and losses, id., § 14--&-45; they are bound to act
among themselves in "the strictest good faith," id., § 14--&-40;
tion and his share of undistributed net earnings, rather than a pro rata
share of the fair market value of the firm's net assets in excess of liabilities.
J . A. 158-59 (1[ 9(a)). Contra Ga. Code § 14-8-45; Bryan v. Maddox, 249
Ga. 762, 295 S. 'E. 2d 60 (1982).
• The fact that the partnership does not operate by majority vote, but
requires instead a two-thirds vote of the partnership to override the decisions of a duly-authorized management committee, see n. 3, supra, is consistent with the view that the partners are ultimately responsible for firm
management.
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and they are the ultimate owners of the partnership assets. 5
Thus, if anything, the "economic realities" of respondent's
organization suggest that its partners are no more "employees" than are partners in a typical partnership. Nor are we
persuaded by petitioner's observation that an employee may
possess any one of the characteristics of a partner without
automatically losing "employee" status. 6 It is the confluence of these characteristics, not any one in particular, that
makes a partner different in kind from an employee. At this
stage, therefore, we are reluctant to accept the contention
that respondent's partners should be considered "employees"
for purposes of Title VII.
B
Petitioner's second theory of liability, which also is advanced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
as amicus, is decidedly more plausible. The partnership itself, the argument goes, is clearly an "employer" for Title
VII purposes. 7 By the same token, regardless of a partner's
5
This fact is not altered simply because respondent's partners may cash
in their full ownership interests only if the firm eventually dissolves, see n.
3, supra.
• For instance, she points to our finding that under the Fair Labor
Standards Act there "is nothing inherently inconsistent between the coexistence of a proprietary and an employment relationship." Goldberg v.
Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc ., 366 U. S. 28, 32 (1961). Similarly, the
fact that a person had management responsibilities would not alone be sufficient to negate his status as an employee under Title VII. No authority,
however, is cited for the view that a person with all the entitlements and
obligations of a partner is an employee for Title VII purposes, and there is
analogous authority to the contrary. The Seventh Circuit has held that
partners are not to be included when a court calulates the number of employees in a business for purposes of 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b). Burke v.
Friedman, 556 F. 2d 867 (1977).
7
Under Title VII, an "employer" is a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day
in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year ... . " 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b). A "person" is defined to include
a partnership. § 2000e(a).

,
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status, an associate's relation to the partnership is clearly
one of "employment." Title VII explicitly forbids an "employer" from discriminating with respect to an individual's
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" and from
depriving an individual of "employment opportunities" on the
basis of sex. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a). According to petitioner's allegations, one of the most important benefits of a
person's employment as an associate at King & Spalding was
the ultimate prospect of being invited to become a partner.
Therefore, petitioner contends, consideration for partnership
is one of the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"
as an associate, and also an "employment opportunity." If
that is true, of course, Title VII would require that respondent consider each of its associates for partnership without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 8
By force of the statutory language alone, this second theory of liability has an obvious appeal. Even though a partner is not an employee, a particular partnership could still
make consideration for partnership an opportunity or privilege of a person's employment as an associate. The Court of
Appeals, however, concluded that such a construction of Title
VII suffered a fatal flaw not found in the bare statutory language. In the view of the Court of Appeals, Congress would
8
As a third theory of liability, petitioner notes that respondent's refusal
to make her a partner also effectively terminated her employment as an
associate, under the firm's "up or out" policy. Thus, she contends, if the
partnership decision was based on sex, so in effect was the termination decision. We rejected a similar theory, however, in Delaware State College
v. Ricks, 449 U. S. 250 (1980). There, the plaintiff was denied tenure and
was extended instead a one-year nonrenewable employment contract. We
held that the termination of employment at the expiration of the contract
was not an unlawful employment practice independent of the allegedly unlawful refusal to award tenure; it was merely a "delayed, but inevitable,
consequence of the denial of tenure." Id. , at 257-258. Analogously, because petitioner does not allege that the "up or out" policy was administered with regard to sex, she is obliged to devise a theory showing that the
partnership decision itself fell within the protection of Title VII.
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never have approved an application of Title VII that "encroach[ed] upon individuals' decisions to voluntarily associate
in a business partnership." 678 F. 2d, at 1028. The District
Court was more explicit in elaborating the interests it
thought would be threatened by application of Title VII to
partnership decisions. In its view, a statute that purported
to decide what persons a partnership must by law invite to
share in the ownership and management of a business would
raise serious constitutional problems by threatening the partnership's First Amendment freedom of association. The
District Court considered, for example, Justice Goldberg's
comments in his concurring opinion in Bell v. Maryland, 378

u. s. 226 (1964):

"Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but
it is the constitutional right of every person to close his
home or club to any person or to choose his social intimates and business partners solely on the basis of personal prejudices . . . . These and other rights pertaining to privacy and private association are themselves
constitutionally protected liberties." Id., at 313 (emphasis added).
In short, the District Court and the Court of Appeals rec- ·
ognized that Congress did not intend Title VII to interfere
with a partnership's right freely to choose its members.
However, petitioner alleges that the partnership agreed by
contract to consider petitioner for partnership on a "fair and
equal" basis. That is, she alleges that it contractually bound
itself not to discriminate against her on the basis of her sex
when it decided whether to make her a partner. If the evidence shows that respondent indeed made such a contract,
the partnership expressly disavowed the authority it asserts
it had in choosing new members on the basis of any criteria it
wished. The question is not whether Congress intended
Title VII to intrude as a general matter into what are clearly
partnership decisions but whether Title VII provides a federal court remedy when a partnership has made the kind of

...
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contract that petitioner alleges. Petitioner is entitled to her
day in court to prove that the alleged contract was made and
that it was breached. If she makes such proof, the partnership cannot be heard to complain that its associational rights
have been infringed; its associational options would have
been altered by its own contract.

III
We conclude that petitioner's complaint states a claim cognizable under Title VII. The case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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Hishon v. King & Spalding

Dear Chief:
While I agree with your result in this case, I am troubled
by several features of your opinion. As you point out,
"petitioner's second theory of liability supports her
allegations." Op. at 5. Accordingly, I do not see the need for
the extensive dictum on pages 5 and 6 regarding her first theory.
Your opinion also demonstrates that the discussion on page 8 of
resporrlen t' s First Amendment theory is also unnecessary. In
addition, I believe respondent's argument on this point is
clearly wrong. See, e.g., Run¥'on v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176
(1976). See also Bob Jones Un1versity v. United States.
Finally, I am dubious of the opinion's "contract" approach to
Title VII.
I doubt that it accurately characterizes
"petitioner's second theory of liability" or that it reflects a
fair interpretation of the statute's protections.
For these reasons, I am afraid I cannot join your opinion
and will therefore probably write separately.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackm~
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-940

ELIZABETH ANDERSON HISHON, PETITIONER v.
KING & SPALDING
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[January - , 1984]

JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judginent.
In my view, this case can and should be resolved on a different ground than that relied upon by the Court. With all ~
respect, therefore, I cannot join the Court's opinion and con~
cur only in the judginent.
I
As the Court notes, the relevant portions of Title VII, 42
U. S. C. §2000e-(a), provide:
"(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer(!) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin .... "
Petitioner's narrowest submission, 1 and that advanced by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as

4ri«_
c;<} .

1/Lf/fl.f

' Petitioner offers three other theories to support her claim for relief
under Title VII. First, she argues that, in light of King & Spalding's partnership agreement and the economic realities of modern law firm practice,
res ondent's partners are "employees" within the meaning of 42 U. S. C.
§2
e-2(a)( and t erefore respon ent s a1 ure to rna e petitioner a
partner constitutes a discriminatory "refus[al] to hire" in violation of the
statute. Second, petitioner claims that"Uildeffi e firm's "up or out" policy, respondent's refusal to invite her into the partnership effectively
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amicus, entails three simple propositions: (1) Respondent is
an "employer" within the meaning of the statute; (2) as an associate of King & Spalding, petitioner's relationship with respondent was one of "employment" within the meaning of the
statute; and (3) the prospect for advancement to partnership
held out to respondent's associates constitutes a "term[], condition[], or privilege[] of employment" within the meaning of
the statute. Therefore, respondent's alleged discrimination
against petitioner when considering her for partnership was
"an unlawful employment practice" wit nin § :.:..000e-2(a)(l).
Petitioner's first and second propositions are practically
self-evident; indeed, they are not seriously disputed by respondent. First, Title VII defines an "employer" as a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year," 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b), and expressly includes "partnerships" within the definition of "person."
§ 2000e(a). The complaint in this case alleges that respondent is a partnership with more than 50 employees excluding
its associates. J. A. 6. Second, the statute defines an "em.
ployee" s1mply
as a "person employed by ~an employer."
~

amounted to a discriminatory "discharge" under§ 2000a-2(a)(l). Finally,
petitioner and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, appearing
as amicus, contend that discrimination in the selection of associates for
partnership violates § 2000e-2(a)(2), which makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer- ... to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or othe!'\\;se
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." This is so, petitioner claims,
because the prospect of becoming a partner was an integral aspect of her
"status as an employee" at King & Spalding as well as an "employment
opportunity" associated with her job there. In light of the persuasiveness
of petitioner's narrower claim under § 2000e-2(a)(2), infra, at--, there is
no need to address these alternative theories. Nor do I understand the
Court's remarks regarding the first, ante, at 5-6, and second, ante, at 7, n.
8, of these theories to be necessary to its decision.
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§ 2000e(f). There can be no serious doubt, and neither respondent nor the two lower courts have attempted to raise
one, that, as an associate, petitioner, who worked for a salary
and had no ownership interest or management role in King &
Spalding, was "a person employed by" respondent.
Accordingly, the principal question to be decided is
whether the prospect of being admitted to respondent's partnership was one of the "terms, conditions, or privileges" of
petitioner's employment as an associate. Although the relevant words are not defined by the statute, the breadth of the
phrase adopted by Congress indicates that it is intended to
bar a wide range of employment discrimination. See also
infra, at - - . As the memorandum submitted by the Senate managers of the bill that became Title VII explained, the
statute comprehensively prohibits discrimination "in connection with employment." 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964). See
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U. S. 324, 352 (1977). See also 110 Cong. Rec. 12618
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Muskie) (broad statutory phrase
adopted as only practical alternative to "a complete itemization of every practice which could conceivably be a violation"). Similarly, we have interpreted the analogous phrase
in the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158(d),
upon which Title VII was largely modeled, see Franks v.
Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 768-770 (1976),
as generally embracing "aspect[s] of the relationship between
the employer and employees." 2 Allied Chemical & Alkali
W01·kers, Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404
U. S. 157, 178 (1971). See also NLRB v. Borg-Warner
z Title 29 U. S. C. § 158(d) defines collective bargaining, inter alia, as
requiring employers and employees to meet and confer "with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. ... " The
additional word "privileges" in Title VII suggests that its scope is, if anything, broader than that of the analogous phrase in the National Labor Relations Act.
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Corp., 356 U. S. 342, 353 (1958) (opinion of Harlan, J.); Ford
Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U. S. 448, 495-496 (1979)." 3
As the Court notes, the district court's dismissal of the
complaint cannot be sustained unless "it appears beyond
At the conclusion of its opinion, the Court adopts a novel theory of
Title VII under which petitioner must prove the existence of a common law
contract in order to receive the protections of the federal statute. Ante, at
8-9. The Court apparently holds that, because "Con~:··ess di 1 not intend
Title VII to interfere with a partnership's right freely to choose its members," ante, at 8, a plaintiff must establish that a law firm defendant contractually waived its exemption from the statute. If this is what the Court
means, I respectfully suggest that its analysis is flawed. There is no evidence in either the language or the legislative history of the statute that
Congress intended to exempt from the plain meaning of Title VII a law
firm's decisions respecting the terms and conditions of an associate's employment, see infra, at - - , and the suggestion that a eontrary intent
would violate the First Amendment is without merit, see infra, at - - .
Moreover, if in fact "Congress did not intend Title VII to interfere '\\-ith a
partnership's right freely to choose its members," I cannot understand how
"Title VII [could nevertheless] provide[) a federal court remedy when a
partnership has made the kind of contract that petitioner alleges." Ante,
at 8-9. The drafters of the statute would surely be surprised to learn that
it amounts to a deYice by which parties can consent to bring their contract
disputes \\ithin the jurisdiction of the federal courts. And if the Court's
holding is as I have described it, it leaves completely unresolved the ultimate question presented by this case: Once petitioner has established respondent's contractual "consent" to the jurisdiction of a federal court, what
must she then show to prove that respondent discriminated against her
with respect to the "terms, conditions, or privileges of [her] employment"?
The Court's repeated references to contract law may constitute its implicit answer to that question. Specifically, the Court may be suggesting
that in order to state a claim for relief under Title VII a plaintiff must allege that the defendant "made a contract to consider petitioner for partnership on a 'fair and equal' basis." Ante, at 3. Such a standard of proof
would , in my view, constitute an inappropriate reading of the federal statute. Express or implied employment contracts unquestionably provide an
important source for identifying, in a given case, the particular nature of
"compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" within the
meaning of§ 2000e-2(a)(l). It is, however, difficult to see the point of the
elaborate scheme adopted by Congress if it does no more than afford a federal forum for efforts to enforce common law contracts to provide "fair and
8
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doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
[her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief." McLain v.
Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U. S. 232, 246
(1980), quoting, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Based on respondent's 0\\'11 undisputed affidavit~, petitioner
provides a sufficient jurisdictional basis for her claim that, at
King & Spalding, consideration of associates for partnership
comes within the broad scope of the statute's language. As
the EEOC puts it, "[t]o say that the prospect for advancement to partnership is 'an aspect of the relationship' between
the associate and a law firm is an understatement." Brief
for the EEOC, at 9. The record provides a basis for petitioner's claim that at King & Spalding, as at most large firms ,
the prospect of becoming a partner is central to a young attorney's decision to accept employment with the firm; to the
firm's ability to attract and train highly-qualified lawyers;
and to the associate's tenure for several years as an apprentice for partnership. For instance, in answering petitioner's
complaint, respondent acknowledged that "all associates are
equal" treatment. In fact, the language and history of the statute, as well
as our interpretations of it and analogous laws, plainly demonstrate that
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) is meant broadly to prohibit discrimination in "aspect[s] of
the relationship between employer and employees," supra, at--, and
not somehow to federalize the law of contracts. Nor, consistent with Congressional intent, can state contract law hinder achievement of the statute's aims. For instance, sex discrimination in the opportunity to participate in a deferred compensation plan could not escape the prohibitions of
Title VII simply because it was "express" or "contractual." Cf., Arizona
GoPenzing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred CompensaU. S. - - (1983); Los Angeles Dept. of Water &
tion Plans\'. ]\'orris , Pou·er v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702 (1978). See also Peters v. MissouriPacific Railroad Co., 483 F. 2d 490, 492, n. 3 (CA 5 1973). See generally,
B. Schlei and P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 23-25 (1976).
In short, while proof of a contractual undertaking by respondent not to discriminate against women rna~· strengthen petitioner's Title VII claim, respondent's obligation to treat its employees equally does not derive solely
from its voluntary promise to do so. It is, instead, a mandate of federal
law.
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employed with the expectation that they will be considered
for invitation to the partnership on a fair and equal basis
within a reasonable period of time if they meet the firm's
standards for partnership." J. A. 30-31.4 Similarly, one of
respondent's partners testified that "most of the lawyers considered for partnership are considered after having joined the
firm following law school or judicial clerkships and after
working at the firm as an associate for a number of years,"
J. A. 45. The same partner also explained that associates at
the firm receive regular evaluations intended partly to assess
their suitability for partnership, J. A. 45-46. Finally, respondent's policy of asking associates who do not become
partner to leave the firm, see J. A. 31-32, coupled with the
fact that the firm's associates form the principal pool from
which partners are dravm, shows that the firm is chiefly interested in lawyers as potential partners. In sum, again
quoting the EEOC, "the opportunity to become a partner,
and the firm's consideration of the associate for partnership,
shape the entire relationship between the firm and its employee." Brief for EEOC, at 9. That opportunity is therefore clearly one of the more significant of an associate's
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. "
II
Respondent advances essentially three counterarguments
to petitioner's position. I find none of them persuasive.

A
First, respondent asserts that "[e]lection to the partnership is not a promotion. It is a change in status from em• The finn's settled practices in this and other respects need not rise to
the level of a contractual arrangement in order to constitute evidence that
consideration for partnership is a "term[], condition[], or privilege[]" of an
associate's employment at King & Spalding. Instead, petitioner need
show only that similarly situated male associates were in fact customarily
considered for partner and that she was denied consideration on an equal
basis because of her sex. Title \'II would prohibit respondent from im-
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ployee to employer-owner-a change of kind, not degree."
Brief for Respondent, at 64 (footnote omitted). Because a
partner is not an "employee" within the meaning of the statute, respondent contends, the decision whether to elevate an
associate to that status cannot be an employment decision
under Title VII.
Assuming that partners are not in fact employees, see n. 1
supra, this reasoning does not affect the conclusion that consideration of associates for partnership is a "term[], condition[], or privilege[]" of their employment. 5 For example, in
Golden State Buitling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U. S. 168, 187-189
(1973), which presented an analogous question under the
labor laws, we held that an employee may not be denied promotion to a position exempt from statutory protections on
grounds that violate the statute. In that case, the Court
unanimously adopted the reasoning of NLRB v. Bell Aircraft
Corp., 206 F. 2d 235, 237 (CA2 1953):
"At the time the discrimination took place he was clearly
a protected employee, and his prospects for promotion
were among the conditions of his employment. The Act
protected him so long as he held a nonsupervisory position, and it is immaterial that the protection thereby afforded was calculated to enable him to obtain a position
in which he would no longer be protected."
Similarly, it is immaterial that the employment opportunity
petitioner was allegedly denied because of her sex was one
which might have placed her outside of Title VII's protection.
properly treating its male employees better than its female employeeseven if it had promised to engage in such discrimination. Seen. 3, supra.
6
The fact that consideration for partnership may occur just before the
end of an associate's employment renders that opportunity no Jess a term
or condition of employment than the chance to participate in a pension plan,
the benefits of which will obviously be realized after termination of employment. See, e. g., Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F. 2d 1040, 1042
(CA4 1976); Peters v. Missouri-Pacific R.R., supra; Rosen v. Public Serv-
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B
Respondent also contends that, notwithstanding the apparent applicability of the language of Title VII, the statute was
not intended to apply to consideration of associates for partnership. The Court of Appeals apparently adopted this argument, concluding that "[d]ecisions as to who will be partners are not within the protection of Title VII." Pet. App.
A13. Neither respondent nor the court below has, however,
identified any provision of Title VII or any portion of its legislative history to support this conclusion. 6 Instead reversing the presumption created by the plain language of the statute, respondent claims that Congress's silence reflects an
implicit intention to exclude consideration of associates for
partnership from the scope of the statute.
Neither the purposes nor the history of Title VII indicates
that Congress meant to insulate employment discrimination
of the kind claimed here from the plain meaning of
§ 2000e-2(a). The statute represents a comprehensive effort
to ban "all practices in whatever form which create inequality
in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis
of race, religion , sex, or national origin." County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U. S. 161, 178 (1981). See also Me1

ice Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F . 2d 90, 94-95 (CA31973); Bartmess v. Dreurrys
U.S. A., Inc., 444 F . 2d 1186, 1188 (CA7 1971).
The only piece of legislative history cited by respondent in support of
its contention that Congress implicitly exempted law firm decisions concerning partners from Title VII is a comment made by Senator Cotton
prior to passage of the statute. Speaking in support of a bill that would
have excluded from the statute employers with fewer than 100 employees,
Senator Cotton observed that "when a small businessman .. . selects an
employee, he comes very close to selecting a partner." 110 Cong. Rec.
13,085 (1964). Respondent suggests that this comment demonstrates that
"selecting a partner" was u\derstood to be outside of the statute's coverage. Balanced against the evidence that Congress did not intend to exclude partnership decisions from the statute, see infra, a t - , however,
these remarks by a Senator who unsuccessfully sought to limit the scope of
the statute ultimately passed have little weight. See NLRB v. Fruit
Packers , 377 U. S. 58, 66 (1964).
6
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Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 800 (1973);
S. Rep. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 12 (1964). Consistent with these broad aims, the House Report expressed the
hope that Title VII would improve employment opportunities
for "teachers, doctors, lawyers, scientists, and engineers."
H. R. Rep. No. 914 (Pt. 2), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1963)
(separate views of Rep. McCulloch and others). And when
Congress intended to exclude certain kinds of employers
from the comprehensive reach of the statute, it said so expressly. See, e. g., 42 U. S.C. §2000e(b)(2) (bona fide private membership clubs); § 2000e(b)(l) (the United States government); § 2000e-1 (religious corporations and associations);
§ 2000e(b) (employers with fewer than a certain number, usually 15, employees). 7 Under these circumstances, respondent's claim that Congress silently adopted a similar exemption for law firm partnership decisions is unavailing.

c
Finally, respondent suggests that Title VII cannot be read
to apply to a law firm's partnership decisions without threatening the partnership's First Amendment freedom of associa'Congress's decision to create specific exemptions for small businesses
and for private clubs demonstrate that it took account of policy concerns
\\ith privacy and associational interests when it enacted Title VII. See
110 Cong. Rec. 13088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (businesses that
exceed statutory number of employees "lose most of whatever intimate,
personal character they might have had"). See also Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 103 (amending
§ 2000e-1 to remove exemption for educational institutions); Lieberman v.
Gant, 630 F. 2d 60 (CA2 1980) (applying amended § 2000e-1 to faculty tenure decisions); 118 Cong. Rec. 3800-3801 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams
and Sen. Javits) (opposing unsuccessful proposal to exempt from Title VII
employment of hospital physicians on ground amendment would undermine
"fundamental" purpose of statute to allow "minorities and women ... access to high-level and professional job categories). Respondent's contentions in this Court that the presence of these and similar interests in a law
finn outweigh the statute's policy against discrimination, see, e. g., Brief
for Respondent, at 10-28, 38--44, are therefore addressed to the \\Tong
branch of government.
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tion. • On several occasions, however, this Court has explained that while the Consititution may protect association
for purposes of advocating discrimination, it does not shield
from otherwise valid legislation the practice of discrimination
itself. In Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 176 (1976), for
example, we explained:
From [the] principle [of associational freedom recognized in cases like NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415
(1963)] it may be assumed that parents have a First
Amendment right to send their children to educat;onal
institutions that promote the belief that racial segregation is desirable, and that the children have an equal
right to attend such institutions. But it does not follow
that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such
institutions is also protected by the same principle. As
the Court stated in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455
[(1973)], "the Constitution ... places no value on discrimination," id., at 469, and while "[i]nvidious private
discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First
Amendment ... it has never been accorded affirmative
constitutional protections. And even some private discrimination is subject to special remedial legislation in
certain circumstances under § 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment; Congress has made such discrimination unlawful in other significant contexts." ld., at 470. (Emphasis original).
See also Bob Jones University v. United States, - - U. S.
- - , - - (1983); id., at-- (opinion of POWELL, J.); id., at
- - , n. 3 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); Norwood v. Harrison, supra, at 470 and n. 10; Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi,
8

The Court seems to signal its approval of respondent's First Amendment argument, see ante, at 8, which also formed the basis of the district
court's dismissal of petitioner's complaint, see Pet. App. at A18-A20. If
the Court means to imply that this argument has merit, I respectfully disagree for the reasons set out in the text.
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326 U. S. 88, 93-94 (1945). Cf., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.
1, 6~6 (1976) (per curiam); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S.
449, 460 (1958).
In this case, petitioner asserts that respondent discriminated against her and respondent makes no colorable claim
that its ability to advance its political views or otherwise engage in protected activities will be hampered if Title VII acts
to bar it from continuing such discrimination. The suggestion that respondent's alleged "[i]nvidious private discrimination" deserves "affirmative constitutional protections," cf.,
Norwood v. Harrison, supra, at 470, is therefore v.ritho·1t
merit.
III
Petitioner's complaint alleges that res'pondent, in denying
her equal consideration for advancement to partnership because of her sex, discriminated against her v.rith respect to a
term, condition, or privilege of her employment as an associate at King & Spalding. J. A. 7. In my view, this allegation
states a claim upon which relief can be granted under the
plain meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Accordingly, I
join the Court's judgment reversing the dismissal of the case.
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CHIEF JUSTICE

December 30, 1983

Re:

82-940 - Hishon v. King & Spalding

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
There seems to be a considerable feeling that the case should
not turn on the contract, as in my first circulation.
In light of this, I will try my hand at another run.
Happy New Year.

,upr~nu
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CH ..... BI!:RS OF"

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

December 30, 1983

Re:

82-940 - Hishon v. Spalding & King

Dear Chief:
If I understand your proposed draft op1n1on, there
could be no recovery under Title VII apart from the
alleged contractual theory. If this analysis is
correct, I wonder if there is federal jurisdiction to
award recovery on a breach of contract theory inasmuch
as the parties are both citizens of the same State.
I had thought the Conference had decided that
Title VII did provide a remedy in a case in which it
was alleged that male employees were eligible for
partnership but female employees were not. If that
theory is accepted, I think Bill Brennan is correct in
suggesting that there is no need to express an opinion
on the partnership theory discussed at pp. 2-6, or, it
would seem to me, on the theory that you reject in
footnote 8 on p. 7.
As presently advised, I therefore expect to wait
for further writing.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

/

dac 12/30/83
To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

David

Re:

Hishon v. King & Spalding, No. 82-940

I believe that the Chief Justice's opinion generally
reflects your views of this case.

However, the last paragraph of

part II, pp. 8-9, is difficult to interpret.

As I understand it,

the paragraph argues that Title VII provides a federal court remedy when a partnership, which otherwise would be free to discriminate, promises its employees "fair and equal" treatment.
The paragraph does not clearly explain the basis for this argument.

It suggests that the partnership may have waived by con-

tract an judicially implied Title VII exemption, but does not
indicate how such a "waiver" can confer jurisdiction upon the
federal court or a cause of action upon a plaintiff who would
otherwise have none.

Clearly, the federal court cannot exercise

jurisdiction over a state contract action, and Title VII was not
intended by Congress to be a jurisdictional provision.
I can see at least two bases for the argument presented
here.

The premise of both approaches is that respondent, by con-

tractually promising its employees "fair and equal" treatment,
has removed itself from the class of partnerships whose associational rights arguably would be violated by the application of
Title VII.

Two consequences might follow.

First, even if it

were the intent of Congress to· respect rights of association, as
the Court should presume in interpreting the statute, Title VII
could still be construed to apply in petitioner's case, because

page 2.

respondent is no longer in the class of protected associations
with regard to its relationships with its employees.

For the

same reason, the Court might find as a prudential matter that
respondent does not have standing to assert its freedom of association in this case as a matter of constitutional right.

I am

afraid, however, that the opinion is a long way from providing
adequate grounding for either approach.

January 2, 1984
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& Spaldinq

Dear Chief:
t am generally with you in this case. In view of
questjons raised by other Justices, I make the following
suggestion:

Of course a federal court cannot exercise ;urisdiction over a state contract action absent diversitv, and
Title VII - in and of its~lf - does not confer such juris, diction. The followinq reasoning may support your desire to
write narrowly. We must accept, on a motion to di.smiss,
that King & Spalding contractually promised Hishon "fair and
equal" treatment with respect to partnership, and thereby
removed itself from the class of partnershios whose associational rights arguably would be violated if Title VII were
applied to the partnership decision. We could assume that it
was the intention of Congress to respect the traditional
rights of association that have characterized law partnerships for centuries. Title VII stilJ could be construed to
apply to Hishon's case because King & Spalding is no longer
in the class of protected associations - at least with respect to Hishon in view of the alleged express agreement
made with her.
Although not articulated exactly as I have, Hishon
brought this suit under Title VII, the courts and counsel
have viewed it as a 'T'itle VII case, and it seems to me that
on the assumptions above stated this reasoning is sound.
Whether you could get a Court may be another matter.
Letters to you from three of our colleagues have
suggested it is unnecessary to discuss the status of a partnership if we hold that associate lawyers mav be employees
within the meaning of Title VII. But I would not agree - at
least as presently advised - that ~ law firm invariably is
an employer of associate lawyers. I think we should say

2.

this, much as you have. We took this case to determine the
extent to which a law firm is subject to ~itle VII. For me,
this question should be decided on a case-by-case basi~ depending on what commitments were made at the time of emplovment.
We resolve little or nothing if we limit our opinion as others have suggested.
Sincerely,

The Chief
J. fp/sC3

~ustice

~upf ·mt
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CHAMBERS Of"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 3, 1984

Re:

82-940 - Hishon v. King & Spalding

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Con f erence
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

January 3, 1984

No. 82-940

Hishon v. King & Spalding

Dear Chief,
I will wait for your revised opinion in
this case.
I still think the opinion should recognize
a recovery under Title VII rather than on simply the
contract theory.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

January 4, 1984

Re:

No. 82-940-Hishon v. King & Spalding

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your opinion concurring in
the judgment.
Sincerely,

.

~T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

To: Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

t f
j_

/
·

The Chief Justice

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated:

2nd I)RAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-940

ELIZABETH ANDERSON HISHON, PETITIONER
v. KING & SPALDING
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1984]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari to determine whether the District
Court properly dismissed a Title VII complaint alleging that
a law partnership discriminated against petitioner, a woman
lawyer employed as an associate, when it failed to invite her
to become a partner.
I

A
In 1972 petitioner Elizabeth Anderson Hishon accepted a
position as an associate with respondent, a large Atlanta law
firm established as a general partnership. When this suit
was filed in 1980, the firm had more than 50 partners and employed approximately 50 attorneys as associates. Up to that
time, no woman had ever served as a partner at the firm.
Petitioner alleges that the prospect of partnership was an
important factor in her initial decision to accept employment
with respondent. She alleges that respondent used the possibility of ultimate partnership as a recruiting device to induce petitioner and other young lawyers to become associates
at the firm. According to the complaint, respondent represented that advancement to partnership after five or six
years was "a matter of course" for associates "who receive[ d)
satisfactory evaluations" and that associates were promoted
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to partnership "on a fair and equal basis." Petitioner alleges
that she relied on these representations when she accepted
employment with respondent. The complaint further alleges that respondent's promise to consider her on a "fair and
equal basis" created a binding- employment contract.
In May 1978 the partnership considered and rejected
Hishon for admission to the partnership; one year later, the
partners again declined to invite her to become a partner. 1
Once an associate is passed over for partnership at respondent's firm, the associate is notified to begin seeking employment elsewhere. Petitioner's employment as an associate
terminated on December 31, 1979.
B
Hishon filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on November 19, 1979, claiming that respondent had discriminated against her on the basis of her
sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U. S. C. §§2000e et Sf3Q. Ten days later the Commission issued a notice· of right to sue, and on February 27, 1980,
Hishon brought this action in the United . States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, back pay, and compensatory
damages "in lieu of reinstatement and promotion to partnership." This, of course, negates any claim for specific performance of the contract alleged.
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground
that Title VII was inapplicable to the selection of partners by
1
The parties dispute whether the partnership actually reconsidered the
1978 decision at the 1979 meeting. Respondent claims it voted not to reconsider the question and that Hishon therefore was required to file her
claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180
days of the May 1978 meeting, not the meeting one year later, see 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e). The District Court's disposition of the case made it
unnecessary to decide that question, and we do not reach it.
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a partnership. 2 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303 (ND
Ga. 1980). A divided panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 678 F. 2d 1022
(1982). We granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1983), and
we reverse.

-n

At this stage of the litigation, we must accept petitioner's
allegations as true. A court may dismiss a complaint only if
it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of
facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The issue before us is whether petitioner's allegations state a claim under
Title VII, the relevant portion of which provides as follows:
"(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer(!) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added).
A

Petitioner alleges that respondent is an "employer" to
whom Title VII is addressed. 3 She then asserts that consid2

The District Court dismissed under Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1) on
the ground that it Jacked subject-matter jurisdiction over petitioner's
claim. Although limited discovery previously had taken place concerning
the manner in which respondent was organized, the court did not find any
"jurisdictional facts" in dispute. See Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U. S. 442,
446 (1942). Its reasoning makes clear that it dismissed petitioner's complaint on the ground that her allegations did not state a claim cognizable
under Title VII. Our disposition makes it unnecessary to consider the
wisdom of the District Court's invocation of Rule 12(b)(1), as opposed to
Rule 12(b)(6).
8
The statute defines an "employer" as a "person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working
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eration for partnership was one of the "terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment" as an associate with respondent. 4
See § 2000e--2(a)(l). If this is correct, respondent could not
base an adverse partnership decision on "race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."
Once a contractual relationship of employment is established, the provisions of Title VII attach and govern certain
aspects of that relationship. 5 The contract may be written
or oral, formal or informal; an informal contract of employment may arise by the simple act of an mg a JO a plicant a
sliove an prov1 mg a wor p ace.
e contractual relations 1p of emp oyment. triggers the provision of Title VII governing "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."
Title VII in turn forbids discrimination on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Because the underlying employment relationship is contractual, it follows that the "terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment" clearly include benefits that are part of an
employment contract. Here, petitioner in essence alleges
that respondent made a contract to consider her for partnership. 6 Indeed, this promise was allegedly a key contractual
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year," § 2000e(b), and a "person" is explicitly defined to include
"partnerships," § 2000e(a). The complaint alleges that respondent's partnership satisfies these requirements. Joint Appendix 6.
' Petitioner has raised other theories of Title VII liability which, in light
of our disposition, need not be addressed.
5
Title VII also may be relevant in the absence of an existing employment relationship, as when an employer refuses to hire someone. See
§ 2000e-2(a)(l). However, discrimination in that circumstance does not
concern the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," which is the
focus of the present case.
6
Petitioner not only alleges that respondent promised to consider her for
partnership, but also that it promised to consider her on a "fair and equal
basis." This latter promise is not necessary to petitioner's Title VII claim.
Even if the employment contract did not afford a basis for an implied condition that the ultimate decision would be fairly made on the merits, Title
VII itself would impose such a requirement. If the promised consider-
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provision which induced her to accept employment. If the
evidence at trial establishes that the parties contracted to
have petitioner considered for partnership, that promise
clearly was a term, condition, or privilege of her employment. Title VII would then bind respondents to consider
petitioner for partnership as the statute provides, i. e., without regard to petitioner's sex. The contract she alleges
would lead to the same result.
Petitioner's claim that a contract was made, however, is
not the only allegation that would qualify respondent's consideration of petitioner for partnership as a term, condition,
or privilege of employment. An employer may provide its
employees with many benefits that it is under no obligation to
furnish by any express or implied contract. Such a benefit,
though not a contractual right of employment,~ qualify as
a "privileg_e" of em~oyment under Title yn. A benefit t hat
is part and parcel of tlie employment relationship may not be
doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer
would be free under the employment contract simply not to
provide the benefit at all. Those benefits that comprise the
"incidents of employment," S. Rep. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1964), 7 or that form "an aspect of the relationship
between the employer and employees," Allied Chemical &
Alkali Workers, Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U. S. 157, 178 (1971), 8 may not be afforded in a manner
ation for partnership is a term, condition, or privilege of employment, then
the partnership decision must be without regard to "race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."
7
Senate Report 867 concerned S. 1937, which the Senate postponed indefinitely after it amended a House version of what ultimately became the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 110 Cong. Rec. 14,602 (1964). The report is
relevant here because S. 1937 contained language similar to that ultimately
found in the Civil Rights Act. It guaranteed "equal employment opportunity," which was defined to "include all the compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. " S. Rep. 867, 88th Cong. , 2d Sess.
24 (1964).
8
Allied Chemical pertains to Section 8(d) of the NLRA, which describes
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contrary to Title VII.
Several allegations in petitioner's complaint would support
the conclusion that the opportunity to become a partner was
part and parcel of an associate's status as an employee at respondent's firm, independent of any allegation that such an
opportunity was included iri associates' employment contracts. Petitioner alleges that respondent's associates could
regularly expect to be considered for partnership at the end
of their "apprenticeships," and it appears that lawyers outside the firm were not routinely so considered. 9 Thus, the
benefit of partnership consideration was allegedly linked directly with an associate's status as an employee, and this
linkage was far more than coincidental: petitioner alleges that
respondent explicitly used the prospect of ultimate partnership to induce young lawyers to join the firm. Indeed, the
importance of the partnership decision to a lawyer's status as
an associate is underscored by the allegation that associates'
employment is terminated if they are not elected to become
partners. These allegations, if proved at trial, would suffice
to show that partnership consideration was a term, condition,
or privilege of an associate's employment at respondent's
firm, and accordingly that partnership consideration must be
without regard to sex.
B
Respondent contends that advancement to partnership
may never qualify as a term, condition or privilege of employthe obligation of employers and unions to meet and confer regarding
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 29
U. S. C. § 158(d). The meaning of this analogous language sheds light on
the Title VII provision at issue here. We have drawn analogies to the
NLRA in other Title VII contexts, see Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976), and have noted that certain sections of Title VII
were expressly patterned after the NLRA, see Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 419 (1975).
9
Respondent's own submissions indicate that most of respondent's partners in fact were selected from the ranks of associates who had spent their
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ment for purposes of Title VII. First, respondent asserts
that elevation to partnership entails a change in status from
an "employee" to an "employer." However, even if respondent is correct that a partnership invitation is not itself an offer of employment, Title VII would nonetheless apply and
preclude discrimination on the basis of sex. The benefit a
plaintiff is denied need not be employment to fall within Title
VII's protection; it need only be a term, condition, or privilege of employment. It is also of no consequence that employment as an associate necessarily ends when an associate
becomes a partner. A benefit need not accrue before a person's employment is completed to be a term, condition, or
privilege of that employment relationship. Pension benefits, ·
for example, qualify as terms, conditions, or privileges of employment even though they are received only after employment terminates. Arizona Governing Committee for Tax
Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation P la?J,s v. Norris,-- U.S.--,-- (1983). Accordingly, nothing in
the change in status that advancement to partnership might
entail means that partnership consideration falls outside the
terms of the statute. See Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine &
Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (SDNY 1977).
Second, respondent argues that Title VII categorically exempts partnership decisions from scrutiny. However, respondent points to nothing in the statute or the legislative
history that would support such a per se exemption. 10 When
entire prepartnership legal careers (excluding judicial clerkships) with the
firm. See Joint Appendix 45-46.
10
The only legislative history respondent offers to support its position is
Senator Cotton's defense of an unsuccessful amendment to limit Title VII
to businesses with 100 or more employees. In this connection the Senator
stated:
"[W]hen a small businessman who employs 30 or 25 or 26 persons selects an
employee, he comes very close to selecting a partner; and when a businessman selects a partner, he comes dangerously close to the situation he faces
when he selects a wife." 110 Cong. Rec. 13,085 (1964); accord 118 Cong.
Rec. 1524, 2391 (1972).

•· ·

82-940-0PINION
8

HISHON v. KING & SPALDING

Congress wanted to grant an employer complete immunity, it
expressly did so. 11
Third, respondent argues that application of Title VII in
this case would infringe constitutional rights f expression or
association. Althoug we have recognized tha e activities
of lawyers may make a "distinctive contribution . . . to the
ideas and beliefs of our society," NAACP v. Button, 371
U. S. 415, 431 (1963), respondent has not shown how its ability to fulfill such a function would be inhibited by a requirement that it consider petitioner for partnership on her merits. Moreover, as we have held in another context,
"[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a
form of exercising freedom of association protected by the
First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative
constitutional protections." Norwood v. Harrison, 413
U. S. 455, 470 (1973). There is no constitutional right, for
example, ·to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a
private school or join a labor union. Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U. S. 160 (1976); Railway Mail Association v. Corsi, 326
u. s. 88, 93-94 (1945).
III
We conclude that petitioner's complaint states a claim cognizable under Title VII. Petitioner therefore is entitled to
Because Senator Cotton's amendment failed, it is unclear to what extent
Congress shared his concerns about selecting partners. In any event, his
views hardly conflict with our narrow holding today: that in appropriate
circumstances partnership consideration may qualify as a term, condition,
or privilege of a person's employment with an employer large enough to be
covered by Title VII.
11
For example, Congress expressly exempted the United States Government, Indian tribes, and certain agencies of the District of Columbia, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e(b)(1), small businesses and bona fide private membership
clubs, § 2000e(b)(2), and certain employees of religious organizations or associations, § 2000e-l. Congress initially exempted certain employees of
educational institutions, § 702, 78 Stat. 255 (1964), but later revoked that
exemption. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 3, 86 Stat.
103.
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her day in court to prove her allegations. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

David

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

May 4, 1984

DATE:

Hishon
I

will

give

you

with

this

memo

a

very

rough

dictated draft of the type of concurring opinion that I
have in mind.
This draft was written without an outline, and
essentiall "off the cuff".

I like the way you write, and

therefore I would appreciate your doing such editing and
revision as you think appropriate.
I think it desirable to make clear how law firms
actually operate,

and to demonstrate the

incompatibility

of Title VII or of any other formalistic determination of
the

typical

decisions

that

are

made

regularly

in

law

firms.
I
case

was

dictated

considered

a

good many rough

at

Conference.

I

ideas before the
have

not

had

opportunity to go over these beyond a quick glance.
may

find

thoughts

there

that are worth adding.

an
You

Some of

what I have said may more properly go into footnotes.

2.

Your brief draft,

that focuses on the right of

association, could either be the first section or the last
I have focused primarily on the

section of the opinion.

practicalities of law firm management and decision making.
These are characteristics of the association of partners
in the practice of law - still a personal relationship.
I

illustrate one interesting difference between

a business corporation and a law firm.
of corporate boards.
of

a

committee's

primarily

by

Annually,

report

senior

that

I sat on a number

and usually on the basis

probably

has

executive officers,

been

the

written

board makes

promotions, salary increases and other important personnel
decisions.
making

Among

process

the many differences in this decision-

is

that

when

officers

recommend

salary

increases to the board, whether for themselves or others,
no one's salary or compensation is reduced.
participation works

quite

differently.

Partnership

Assume

that

the

five lawyers in our Chambers were partners, each initially
with a
one

20%

interest in the profits.

partner's

result
least

is
one

Therefore,

participation

that
or

the

more

other

of

decisions

them
with

is

increased

partners'
-

A year or so later
to

30%.

participation

would

suffer

respect

to

a

The
-

or

reduction.

admission

to

3.

partnership

and

thereafter

with

respect

to

division of

profits are made in response to the question whether:
David

Charny

is

admitted

to

the

firm,

or

if

if
his

participation is increased, will the firm net profit also
increase?
David, I have come to the end of this particular
cassette so I'll quit here but we can talk tomorrow.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

lfp/ss 05/05/84

HISH SALLY-POW

Rough dictated draft before
leaving for CAll Conference
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion holding that
petitioner's complaint alleges a violation of Title VII,
and that the motion to dismiss should not have been
granted.

In this case there was no written contract that

defined the terms of the law firm's employment of
associates, and therefore petitioner's averments entitle
her to the opportunity to prove them.
~

~

Petitioner's

not allege a commitment to admit to

p; rather, it avers a promise by the firm that

~·

2.

she would be considered for partnership on a "fair and
equal basis" within the time span that generally
associates are so considered. 1
I write to make clear my understanding that the
Court's opinion does not apply to the
partners of a law firm itself.

management A~he

The relationship between

partners is very different from that between employer and
employee.

Although judgmental decisions are made with

respect to both relationships, there are significant
differences understood by every lawyer who has been a
partner in the practice of law.

.

1 Law firms customarily require a period of
associateship that usually ~s a prerequisite to being
eligible to "make" partner.
This rarely is an inflexible
period,
as
firms
vary from the norm and admit to
partnership earlier than, or subsequent to, the customary
period of service.
Also, as the complaint recognizes,
many firms make annual evaluations of the performances of
associates, and ~e- frea to terminate employment on the
basis of these evaluations.

3.

It is, of course, true that subjective judgments
are made in the initial selection of associates.

~~

Although

---

~
_}
~xperienC'Eh <M' ~fter employmen ~

" law school performance and
often are the controlling

considerations ~ ~r ~

qualifications frequentlyf re given weight.

But the

selection of associates creates only the relationship of
employer/employee, and is qualitatively different in major
respects from the ultimate choice of partners.
partnership relation is established,

2

Once the

the judgmental

decisions embrace a wide range of intra-partnership
subjects.
Many if not most firms have a managing or

2 Law firms may have several categories of
partners:
salaried, salaried with bonus arrangements, and
participating partners.
When I refer to admission to the
partnership,
I
make
no
distinction
between
these
categories.

4.

executive committee, as does respondent, that has broad
delegated responsibility to make initial decisions. The
more critical decisions, such as admission to partnership,
change of partnership status, and increases in partnership
participation, usually are subject to approval by a
majority in interest of all of the

partner~.

No business

organization is run in this manner, nor are most
.
1 par t ners h.1ps.
nonpro f ess1ona

/1)

~

~

~ ~aw

f.1rm d ec1s1onsAare
. .
~

d-f~

.to ""'"".a-"<.....-~-c..t:~· ~4

-mor€ sensitive,/\ ~ad often more difficul ~ t3~an tl:lese

~ at~ee~~ine

expansion policies; participation in

~~~~.
profits and other types of compensation; work assignments; /

"
approval of commitments in bar association, civic or even
political activities; questions of billing; acceptance of
new clients; and questions of conflicts of interest.

5.

The professional skill of a lawyer is by no
means the only qualification that is considered
particularly in determining participation in profits.
Partnership agreements may provide specifically that
consideration also be given to the partner's ability to
attract and retain clients; to overall productivity; to
~

contributions to the profession through bar organizations;
and to the recognition of the firm's duty to accept
appointment to represent indigents;
and -

rende ~ublic service;

finally - to a partner's spirit and attitude within

the firm.
It hardly need be said that these types of
decisions cannot be measured by conventional business
standards or by any formalistic system.

Essentially, they

are judgmental and discretionary, with the major ones

6.

subject to a vote of the partners.

A law firm simply

could not function if each partner had a statutory right
to aver discrimination with respect to such decisions, and
litigate the question with his or her partners.
I have indicated the familiar way in which law
firms customarily operate because to some extent even the
initial selection of an associate, and certainly the
decision as to partnership admission, also involve some of
these personal judgments.

For example, a capacity to

bring clients to a law firm is essential to its ongoing
viability . of

~

firm.

Similarly, qualities of personality

and character that inspire confidence and retain clients
are important, though difficult to judge absent a period
of association.

Few law firms remain static; they either

tend to increase their clientele or gradually lose it.

7.

Accordingly, decisions that are made with respect to
admissions to the partnership - and to some extent at the
initial employment stage - are critical to the long-term
ability of a firm to render quality legal service.
In the decisions made by law firms, it is now
widely recognized - as it should be - that neither race
nor sex is relevant.

Whatever may have been the views of

an all-masculine partnership even a decade or so ago,
there is no basis in the 1980s for believing that ancient
racial prejudices or ~ misconception as to the
capability of women to make excellent lawyers, continue to
exist.

The qualities of mind, capacity to reason

logically, ability to work under pressure, leadership and
the like are unrelated to race or sex.

This is

demonstrated by the success of women and minorities in law

8.

schools, in the practice of law, on the bench, and in
positions of community, state and national leadership.
Law firms - and, of course, society - are the better for
these changes. 3

3 rf for no other reason, the self-interest of
a
lawj irm
now
dictates
that
judgments
be
made
independently of invidious considerations.

May 5, 1984
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near C'hief:
When I sent you a join note, T han int~nded mentioning the second sentence in the first full paragraph on
p. 4 where you make the point that a contract need not be
written. ~he sentence also says:
"An informal contract of emplovment may arise
by the simple act of handing ~ job applicant
a shovel and providing a work place."
I would think it is necessary to add a footnote
that recognizes qualifications of this sweeping lang•1age.
The statute of frauds still exists in many states. Also, it
is important to make clear, I think, that your "shovel" example would create only a contract subject to termination at
any time at thP. will of either party with or without cause.
I am sure you share my reluctance broadly to invite Title VII suits. We see enough complaints that merely
initiate a law suit in the hope that use of discovery will
find some basis in fact for the suit.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
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THE C HIEF .J U S TI CE

Re:

82-

0 - Hishon v. King S Spalding

Dear Lewis:
Re your note of 5/5, I think it may be too late
to "clarify" the "shovel " matter.
Of course, such a
contract is terminable at will, but I ' m sure there
would be strong views that even that terminability would
be subject to Title VII limits .
I am willing to try, but it may be we should
leave well enough alone.
Regards ,

Justice Powell
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JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re :

No. 82-940, Hishon v. _ King and Spalding

Dear Chief:
PJease join me in your recirculation of May 2.
Sincerely,

'

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Confere nce
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C HAMI!IERS 01'

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 7, 1984
Re:

No. 82-940

Hishon v. King & Spalding

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

May 9, 1984

Re:

No. 82-940-Hishon v. King & Spalding

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T.M.

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference
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~a,g~ ~.

Of.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w...

J . BRENNAN, JR.

May 10, 1984

Re: Hishon v. King & Spalding, No. 82-940

Dear Chief:
This will confirm that I withdraw my separate opinion
in the above.
...._.;

Sincerely,

. .;"l.·
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;

'
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W.J.B.,Jr.
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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HISHON v. KING & SPALDING
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
join

I

petitioner's
and

that

granted.
violated

the

motion

Petitioner's
its

promise

that

to

violation of

dismiss

complaint
that

she

~+-holding

opinion

Court's

complaint alleges a

partnership on a
span

the

P/~

should
avers

would

that

Title VII

not

have

been

that

the

firm

be

considered

for

"fair and equal basis" within the time

associates

generally

are

so

considered.

1

Petitioner is entitled to the opportunity to prove these

1 Law firms normally require a period of associateship as
a prerequisite to being eligible to "make" partner.
This
need not be an inflexible period, as firms may vary from
the norm and admit to partnership earlier than, or
subsequent to, the customary period of service.
Also, as
the
complaint
recognizes,
many
firms
make
annual
evaluations of the performances of associates, and are
free to terminate employment on the basis of these
evaluations.

2.

averments.
I write to make clear my understanding that the
Court's opinion may not be read as extending Title VII to
the

management

relationship
partners
and

-

of

a

among

law

firm

and

is

not

its

partners.

certainly

partners

differs markedly

employee,

by

from

that

properly

The

between

law

between employer

characterized

as

an

employment relationship to which Title VII would apply.
Once the partnership relation is established, the
judgmental decisions that must be made among the partners
embrace a wide range of subjects.

The essence of the law

partnership is the common conduct of a shared enterprise.
The

relationship

decisions
common

among

important

agreement

or

to

law
the

consent

partners

contemplates

partnership will
among

the

be

partners.

that

made

by

Many

3.

firms,

respondent,

like

necessarily

broad

delegate

responsibility to make initial decisions to a managing or
executive committee.
admission

The more critical decisions, such as

to partnership,

change

of

partnership

status,

and increases in partnership participation, generally are
subject to approval by a majority in interest of all of
the partners. 2
Effective

management

of

the

law

firm

involves

judgmental and sensitive decisions concerning such matters
as expansion policies; participation in profits and other
types

of

commitments
activities;

compensation;
in bar

work

association,

questions

of

assignments;
civic or

billing;

approval

of

even political

acceptance

of

new

2 No business organization is run in this manner, nor are
most nonprofessional partnerships.

4.

clients;

and

decisions

may affect

adversely.

questions

of

conflicts

each

Divisions

lawyer of

of

of
the

partnership

Such

interest.
firm,

sometimes

profits,

unlike

shareholders' rights to dividends, involve judgments as to
each partner's contribution to the reputation and success
of the firm.

A partner's professional skill as a lawyer,

even if that were measurable by some objective standard,
would

by

no

means

be

the

only

qualification

that

is

considered in determining his or her participation in the
firm's

profits.

Factors

that may be considered include

the partner's professional reputation; ability to attract
and retain clients; overall productivity; contributions to
the profession through bar organizations;
the

firm's

duty

to

the

community

and

to

recognition of
render

public

5.

service; and -

finally -

to a partner's leadership spirit

and attitude within the firm.
A law

firm

simply

could

not

function

if

each

partner had a statutory right to aver discrimination with
respect
litigate

to

the

association
personal

these

and

similar

question
of

with

partners

relationship

in

tha~

judgmental
his

or

the

practice

cannot

her

be

decisions,

and

partners.

The

of

law

governed

is
by

a
the

determinations that are made in the course of litigating
Title VII suits.
Respondent
application

of

contends

Title

VII

that
to

for

the

these

decisions

partnerships raises constitutional concerns.
no

such

only

to

concerns
a

arise

relationship

in
of

this case.
employer

reasons
of

law

In my view,

Title VII applies
and

employee.

A

6.

partner

in a

law firm is not an employee, and rights of

association may be

implicated.

that respondent as an employer,
to

consider

petitioner

without regard to sex.
obligation,

voluntarily

for

But here it is alleged
is obligated by contract

partnership

on

equal

terms

I agree that enforcement of this
assumed,

impairs

no

right

of

association. 3

3 The Court's opinion properly reminds us that "invidious
private
discrimination
has
never
been
afforded
affirmative constitutional protections." Op. at 8.
This
is not to say, however, that the enforcement of laws that
ban discrimination will always be without cost to other
values, including constitutional values. As I have noted,
such laws may impede the exercise of personal judgments in
choosing one's employees or colleagues.
Impediments to
the exercise of one's rights to choose one's associates
may become so restrictive as to violate the rights of
association
protected
by
the
First
and
Fourteenth
Amendments.
Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 u.s. 415 (1963):
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 u.s. 449 '1958).
With respect to laws that prevent discrimination,
much depends in this respect upon the standards by which
the courts scrutinize private decisions that are an
exercise of rights of association.
For example, the
courts of appeals generally have acknowledged that respect
for ' academic freedom requires some deference to the
judgment
of
schools
and
universities
as
to
the
Footnote continued on next page.

7.

In

the

decisions made

widely recognized -

as

nor sex is relevant.

believing

misconceptions
excellent

that
as

lawyers,

it

is now

that neither race

Whatever may have been the views of
there is no basis in the 1980s

ancient

to

law firms,

it should be -

even a decade or so ago,
for

by

the

racial

prejudices

capability

continue

to exist.

of

women

or

that

to

make

The qualities of

mind, capacity to reason logically, ability to work under
pressure, leadership and the like are unrelated to race or
sex.

This

is

demonstrated

by

the

success of women and

minorities in law schools, in the practice of law, on the

qualifications of teachers, partie,., ar ly those considered
for tenured positions.
Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60,
67-68 (CA2 1980); Kunda v. Muhlenberg COllege, 621 F. 2d
532, 54 7-548 (CA3 1980) • Cf.
Rege r.ts of the University
of California
v. Bakke, 438 u.s. 265, 311-315 (1978).
The present case, before us on a u.otion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, does not present such
an issue.

8.

bench,

and in positions of community,

leadership.

state and national

Law firms - and, of course. society - are the

better for these changes.
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE

82-940 - Hishon v. King & Spalding
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I have a slight stylistic change that I overlooked
sending out. The second sentence, first full paragraph on
page 4 (line 8) was amended to read:
"In the context of Title VII, the
contract of employment may be written
or oral, formal or informal; an
informal contract of employment may
arise by the simple act of handing a
job applicant a shovel and providing a
workplace." (underlined part is new.)
Absent dissent, this will come down as scheduled
Tuesday.

May 17, 1984

82 - 940 Hishon v. King & Spalding

Dear Chief:
I have made stvlistic changes as indicated in the
enclosed draft that I have sent to th~ printer.

I will circulate this , but wanted you to see the
changes.
Incidentally , I hope you have taken a second look
at the sentence in your opinion describing hmo~ "contracts"
may be made. It could have a far-reachina effect in ~1983
cases.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackrnun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-940
ELIZABETH ANDERSON HISHON, PETITIONER
v. KING & SPALDING
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[May-, 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.

I join the Court's opinion holding that petitioner's complaint alleges a violation of Title VII and that the motion to
dismiss should not have been gianted. Petitioner's complaint avers that the law firm violated its promise that she
would be considered for partnership on a "fair and equal
basis" within the time span that associates generally are so
considered. 1 Petitioner is entitled to the opportunity to
prove these averments.
I write to make clear my understanding that the Court's
opinion should not be read as extending Title VII to the management of a law firm by its partners. The reasoning of the
Court's opinion does not require that the relationship among
partners be characterized as an "employment" relationship to
which Title VII would apply. The relationship among law
partners differs markedly from that between employer and
employee-including that between the partnership and its as1
Law finns normally require a period of associateship as a prerequisite
to being eligible to ''make" partner. This need not be an inflexible period,
as finns may vary from the norm and admit to partnership earlier than, or
subsequent to, the customary period of service. Also, as the complaint
recognizes, many finns make annual evaluations of the performances of associates, and usually are free to terminate employment on the basis of
these evaluations.

82-940-CONCUR
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sociates. 2 The judgmental and sensitive decisions that must
be made among the partners embrace a wide range of subjects. 3 The essence of the law partnership is the common
conduct of a shared enterprise. The relationship among law
partners contemplates that decisions important to the partnership normally will be made by common agreement, see,
e. g., Memorandum of Agreement, King & Spalding, App.
153-164 (Respondent's partnership agreement), or consent
among the partners.
Respondent contends that for these reasons application of
Title VII to the decision whether to admit petitioner to the
finn implicates the constitutional right to association. But
here it is alleged that respondent as an employer is obligated
by contract to consider petitioner for partnership on equal
terms without regard to sex. I agree that enforcement of
this obligation, voluntarily assumed, would impair no right of
association. •
Of course, an employer may not evade the strictures of Title VII simply by labeling its employees as ''partners." Law partnerships usually
have many of the characteristics that I describe generally here.
1
3
These decisions concern such matters as participation in profits and
other types of compensation; work assignments; approval of commitments
in bar association, civic or political activities; questions of billing; acceptance of new clients; questions of conflicts of interest; retirement programs;
and expansion policies. Such decisions may affect each partner of the
firm. Divisions of partnership profits, unlike shareholders' rights to dividends, involve judgments as to each partner's contribution to the reputa-~
tion and success of the firm. This is true whether the partner's participation in profits is measured in terms of points of percentages, combinations
of salaries and points, salaries and bonuses, and possibly in other ways.
• The Court's opinion properly reminds us that "invidious private discrimination ... has never been afforded affirmative constitutional protections." Op., at 8. This is not to say, however, that enforcement of laws
that ban discrimination will always be without cost to other values, including constitutional rights. Such laws may impede the exercise of personal
judgment in choosing one's associates or colleagues. Impediments to the
exercise of one's right to choose one's associates can violate the right of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Cf.
1
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In admission decisions made by law finns, it is now widely
recognized-as it should be-that in fact neither race nor sex
is relevant. The qualities of mind, capacity to reason logically, ability to work under pressure, leadership and the like
are unrelated to race or sex. This is demonstrated by the
success of women and minorities in law schools, in the practice of law, on the bench, and in positions of community, state
and national leadership. Law finns-and, of course, society-are the better for these changes.

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.

449 (1958).
With respect to laws that prevent discrimination, much depends upon
the standards by which the courts examine private decisions that are an
exercise of the right of association. For example, the courts of appeals
generally have acknowledged that respect for academic freedom requires
some deference to the judgment of schools and universities as to the qualifications of professors, particularly those considered for tenured positions.
Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F. 2d 60, 67-68 (CA2 1980); Kunda v. Muhlenberg
College, 621 F. 2d 532, 547-548 (CA3 1980). Cf. Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 311-315 (1978) (opinion of JUSTICE
POWELL). The present case, before us on a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, does not present such an issue.
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